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FOREWORD
Bron McKiI/op
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
University of Sydney.
The main matters considered at this seminarwere —
0 the law relating to illegally obtained evidence in Australia, the United States
and England
0 recent changes in the law in Australia and the United States
what to do about telephone tapping
0 disputed confessions and their relation to illegally obtained evidence.
The principal paper was that presented by Mr Justice Kirby, then Chairman of
the Australian Law Reform Commission and now President of the New South Wales
Court of Appeal. The “dilemma” pointed to by His Honour lies in the need to weigh
against each other competing public interests — the interest in bringing to conviction
those who commit crimes and the interest in the protection of the individual from
unlawful treatment by law enforcement authorities.
As canvassed in His Honour’s paper and oral presentation this dilemma has been
resolved in different ways in different places, and in different ways at different times
in some of those places. Speaking generally
0 In England illegally obtained evidence has continuously been admissible subject
to discretionary exclusion on the grounds of unfairness to the defendant in the
context of the trial.
0 In Australia the English position was followed until R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR
321 in which the High Court extended the discretion to exclude to cover the
protection of the individual’s rights in the course of investigation by law
enforcement authorities was stressed.
0 In the United States the Supreme Court has since early this century interpreted
the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures so
as to exclude evidence obtained in contravention of the Amendment. In recent
months however the Supreme Court has moved away from this absolutist
position and has ruled for example, that evidence obtained in the reasonable
good-faith belief that a search or seizure, even although based on a defective
warrant, was in accord with the Fourth Amendment should not be excluded
(U.'S. v Leon (1984) 52 US Law Week 5155). This new position is based on
a process of weighing the social costs and benefits of exclusion.
Mr Justice Kirby took the opportunity to remind the seminar that the Australian
Law Reform Commission had recommended a “reverse onus exclusionary rule”
whereby unlawfully obtained evidence would not be admitted unless the court were
satisfied, generally by the prosecution, that the balance fell in favour of admission.
This recommendation was supported by those speakers at the seminar who addressed
the matter.
Stating a public interest discretionary rule is one thing. Determining the factors
to be taken into account and the weight to be given to those factors in exercising
that discretion is another. Mr Justice Kirby has in his paper contributed to this latter
in his customary clear and comprehensive manner and in a way which should provide
a basis for further consideration.
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Detective Sergeant Chad in his paper and presentation argued that police who
tape-record telephone conversations with hostage-takers or extortionists, or who bug
hostage-takers talking amongst themselves, should not be exposed to criminal liability
under the Telecommunications (Interception Act) (1979) (Commonwealth) or the
Listening Devices Act 1969 (N.S.W.), and that material so obtained should be
admissible in evidence. Insofar as this -had not already been achieved under the
Commonwealth Act and the yet-to-be- proclaimed Listening Devices Act 1984 in New
South Wales, there was no opposition at the seminar to these arguments.
Dr Woods in his paper saw the present Australian problem as lying in the failure
by judges to exercise their discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Some
doubts were expressed from the floor, however, that judges in New South Wales were
now failing, it being noted that the public interest exclusionary discretion has only
been seen as firmly established since Bunning v Cross in 1978. Dr Woods also
advocated, for the protection of our interest in privacy, the absolute exclusion of
any evidence obtained by the use of illegal telephone taps or bugging devices.
The seminar was fortunate to have the benefit of two papers contributed and
presented by American scholars — Alan Ransom and Henry di Suvero — outlining
the position in the United States in relation particularly to illegal search and seizure.
The focus of these papers was on the recent movement by the Burger Court away
from defendants’ rights towards public security interests.
Indeed Alan Ransom in the presentation of his paper suggested that we might
see “the ebb and flow of criminal law and criminal jurisprudence in the United States”
as reﬂecting “the politics of the public view of criminality” or “as the Supreme Court
following the election returns”. This was further suggested to be “a good thing”.
Henry di Suvero in the presentation of his paper, modestly entitled “A Brief
Outline. . .”, drew attention to a number of pertinent matters
0 the Constitutional dimension of the guarantee against illegal search and seizure
in the United States, on both a Federal and State level
0 search and seizure produces real evidence so that unlike confessions, the question
of the reliability of the evidence generally does not arise
0 the cost/benefit analysis of the majority in Leon sees the cost of admission of
evidence in terms of a particular defendant’s rights rather than society’s interest
in privacy\ -
0 the problem with a discretionary exclusion rule is that it requires enormous
courage in the judge to exclude what is invariably important evidence.
The discussion which followed the presentation of papers ranged over a variety
of topics. Confessions, particularly the need for recording or independently witnessing
them, received attention from a number of speakers, although others pointed out
that reliability, the main concern with confessions, was not generally a problem with
illegally obtained evidence. It is perhaps noteworthy in this connection that Detective
Sergeant Chad would welcome the tape-recording of confessions. A Bill of Rights
for Australia was canvassed but the prevailing view was that one was unlikely in the
foreseeable future. The Age newspaper and the New South Wales police tapes it
published both received hostile comment. Entrapment was suggested as a common
law defence to a criminal charge as in the United States.
If there were a consensus at the seminar as to a rule in Australia for illegally
obtained evidence it was for an exclusionary rule subject to a judicial discretion to
admit on weighing the competing public interests.
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THE DILEMMA 0F UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
The Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby C.M.G.*
' and
Stephen J OdgersM
Mapp Revisited: An American Turn-about
Consider these facts. An anonymous informant tells a police officer that a number
of people are selling large quantities of cocaine. The police investigate. They observe
the named persons, some of whom have prior drug trafficking convictions. Although
there is no clear evidence corroborating the anonymous tip off, a search warrant is.
obtained. Large quantities of drugs are discovered. At their trial the accused persons
argue that the search was unlawful, because the relevant requirements for a police
search had not been met. The court agrees. The ultimate issue before the court then
becomes whether the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search, namely
evidence of the drugs found, should be excluded from the trial. If such evidence is
excluded it will result in the collapse of the prosecution.
Brieﬂy stated these are the facts of United States v Leonl, a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States handed down on 5 July 1984. It is not too much
to say that Leon is a landmark in American jurisprudence. It marks a turning point
in the law relating to unlawfully obtained evidence. Before it, the Supreme Court
had generally followed the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, regulating search and seizure, must be excluded from any subsequent
trial of the individual whose rights were infringed.2 But six members of the Court
held in Leon that the exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar admission
of ‘evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was
in accord with the Fourth Amendment’.3
In language that is now becoming familiar to students of the Burger Supreme
Court, the majority Justices resolved the question of whether an exclusionary sanction
was appropriate in the particular case ‘by weighing the costs and beneﬁts of preventing
the use’ of the evidence by the prosecution. In terms of this test the majority concluded
that the exclusionary rule could be ‘modiﬁed somewhat without jeopardising its ability
to perform its intended functions’.4
The Issue: A Competition of Public Policies
The basic issue which the United States Supreme Court confronted in Leon, and
which any legal system confronts when evidence is illegally obtained, is a conflict
of public interests. On the one hand, it is in the public interest that reliable evidence
of an accused person’s guilt be admitted into the trial and considered by the tribunal
‘ Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission. Judge of the Federal Court of Australia. The
views expressed are personal views only.
" Senior Law Reform Officer, Australian Law Reform Commission
1. 52 US Law Week 5155 (1984).
2. Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961) The Supreme Court has,
on some previous occasions, however, found it necessary to withdraw to a limited extent from an absolute
exclusionary rule: Brown v US 411 US 223 (1973) (limited standing to complain); Wong Sun v US 371
US 471 (1963) (attentuation of taint); Walder v US 347 US 62 (1954) (admissible re credibility).
3. Per White J at 5158, delivering the opinion of the majority, quoting from his judgment in Illinois v
Gates (1983) unreported.
4. At 5157
 5. 277 US 438, 484 (1928).
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of fact. All trials should operate on an accurate assessment of material facts and,
in the area of criminal law, criminals should be convicted and crime thereby punished
and deterred. This public interest requires that relevant evidence of an accused person’s
guilt should be admitted into the trial to form the basis for the necessary factual
determination and consequent conviction. If the evidence is excluded for reasons not
associated with the fact finding process this interest is sacrificed.
On the other hand, there is also a public interest in minimising the extent to which
law enforcement agencies of the state, themselves sworn to uphold and defend the
law, act outside the scope of their lawful authority. This public interest may be seen
from a'number of different perspectives:
0 Discipline Ofﬁcerfor Illegality. The courts are parts of the criminal justice system
and it may be argued that they should act to punish or discipline law enforcement
officers who break the law. If evidence is obtained illegally, one powerful
mechanism of ‘discipline’ available is the exclusion of the evidence. Such
exclusion deprives the officer of the fruits of his unlawful conduct which, if
overlooked, may condone the misconduct and even sanction it. Almost certainly
the judicial exclusion and the reasons for such exclusion will come to the notice
of the officer’s superiors and may lead to appropriate discipline.
0 Deter Future Illegality. An extension of the previous argument is that improperly
obtained evidence can be excluded from trial in order to deter police misconduct
generally. The rationale is that potential exclusion of any evidence produced
by such means will eliminate the incentive to such conduct. Two distinct types
of deterrence additional to the effect of the exclusion on the particular officer
who acted improperly may operate:
** general deterrence —— the effect of that exclusion on other officers;
” systematic deterrence — the effect on individual officers of an agency’s
institutional compliance with judicially articulated standards.
0 Protection ofIndividual Rights. The legal system should generally act to protect
and vindicate a citizen’s rights. In addition, it should vindicate the rights of
other citizens by making it clear that infringement of a citizen’s rights will not
be ignored. It is arguable that a suspect whose rights have been infringed should
not hereby be placed at any disadvantage — he should be placed in the same
position he would have been in if the official misconduct had not occurred.
To achieve this, evidence obtained improperly should be excluded.
0 Executive and Judicial Legitimacy. If the courts permit the admission of evidence
illegally obtained by an arm of the government, the public will perceive that
government, and law enforcement agencies in particular, while purporting to
maintain the law, actually claim the right to act without restraint. The
government will lose respect and eventually be seen as illegitimate. The legitimacy
of the judicial system is also at risk. United States Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis, in Olmstead v United States“, desired to ‘preserve the judicial process
from contamination by preventing courts from impliedly approving illegal
conduct through admission of unlawfully [obtained] evidence’.
A Decade of Australian Reform
Until the 1970’s, Australian law, following English precedents, had taken the
view that the courts, when deciding whether to admit evidence, should generally
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disregard illegality or impropriety in the methods used to obtain it. A court had a
discretion to exclude such evidence if its admission would operate unfairly against
the accused6 but the general emphasis of the law was on evidentiary reliability.7 Such
an approach had the merit of minimising the complexity of a criminal trial, avoiding
collateral issues, and maximising the amount of reliable evidence admitted for the
consideration of the tribunal of fact. It reflected a view that the issue of improper
conduct should not be ignored but dealt with in some forum other than the trial of
a criminal defendant. This division of functions was justified both for efficiency and
constitutional reasons. Nonetheless, it resulted sometimes in trial judges ignoring
serious infringements of human rights by law enforccement authorities. It was
inconsistent in its practice with the historical role of the courts in ensuring that the
criminal process is just, to encourage them to disregard impropriety occurring during
criminal investigation and before trial. It ignored the public interests supporting
exclusion of the evidence. Further, such an approach ignored the reality that, on
occasion, there are no effective alternative methods available to an individual citizen
whose rights have been infringed to obtain justice. Subsequent police discipline would
be scant satisfaction to the accused convicted and imprisoned on the basis of illegally
obtained evidence where, but for this official illegality, no conviction could have been
secured.
The solution which has been adopted in Australia is to require the trial judge
to balance the various public interests in the circumstances of the particular case.
In R v Ireland8 Chief Justice Barwick asserted that, whenever ‘unlawfulness or
unfairness appears, the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence’ after balancing
the ‘public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences’ against
‘the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair
treatment’. In 1975, the Australian Law Reform Commission, in its Second (Interim)
Report on Criminal Investigation9 concluded ‘that the most appropriate rule for the
admissibility of evidence illegally obtained would be one’ that such evidence ‘should
not be admissible in any criminal proceedings for any purpose unless the court decides,
in the exercise of its discretion, that the admission of such evidence would specifically
and substantially benefit the public interest without unduly derogating from the rights
and liberties of any individual’.10 Factors relevant to the exercise of this discretion
were stated to include
(i) the seriousness of any crime being investigated, the urgency or difficulty of
detection of it and the urgency of attempting to preserve real evidence of it;
(ii) the accidental or trivial quality of the contravention; and
(iii) the extent to which the illegally obtained evidence could have been lawfully
obtained by means of an available common law or statutory procedure.‘1
In 1978, Justices Stephen and Aickin of the High Court, with whom the rest
of the High Court were in general agreement, held in Bunning v Cross12 that a trial
 
6. Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197; Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559.
7. This point has been made clear by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Sang [1979] 2 A1 1 ER 1222.
8. (1970) 126 CLR 321.
9. Australian Law Reform Commission, Interim Report No 2, Criminal Investigation (AGPS, Canberra,
1975).
10. id, para 298. The burden of satisfying the court that any illegally obtained evidence should be admitted
would rest on the party seeking to have it admitted, ie normally the prosecution.
ll. ibid.
12. (1978) 141 CLR 54.
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judge has a discretion to exclude illegally (or improperly) obtained evidence after the
‘weighing against each other of two competing requirements of public policy, thereby
seeking to resolve the apparent conflict between the desirable goal of bringing to
conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even
encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce
the law’.13 .
This formulation, perhaps better than that initially proposed by the Commission,
well expressed the competing public policies involved in this area. But while the
Australian Law Reform Commission had recommended a ‘reverse onus exclusionary
rule’, whereby unlawfully obtained evidence would not be admitted unless the court
was satisﬁed that the balance fell in favour of admission“, Justices Stephen and Aickin
took the view that no rule of inadmissibility existed, so that the burden lay on the
party seeking to have the evidence excluded.15 The Justices also expanded on the list
of factors suggested by the Commission as relevant to exercise of the discretion. While
not advancing an exclusive list, they noted several relevant considerations.16
0 consideration of whether the law enforcement authorities consciously appreciated
their use of unlawful or improper means to obtain evidence.
0 consideration, where the illegality or impropriety in obtaining the evidence was
neither deliberate nor reckless (and, in certain exceptional circumstances, even
where it was deliberate or reckless), of the cogency of the evidence obtained.
0 consideration of the ease with which the law might have been complied with
in procuring the evidence in question.
0 consideration of the comparative seriousness of the offence charged and of the
improper conduct of the law enforcement authorities.
0 consideration of the extent to which legislation relative to the evidence procured
evinces an intention to restrict the power to procure it.
0 consideration of the urgency in obtaining the evidence.
0 consideration of the availability of alternative, equally cogent evidence.
0 fairness to the accused.
Other factors have been suggested by subsequent State Supreme Court decisions:
0 consideration of whether the impropriety has been otherwise dealt with.17
0 difficulty of detection of the particular crime involved.18 '
0 degree of~infringement of rights.19
Most recently, the High Court of Australia held in Cleland v The Queen20 that
this disdretion applies to improperly obtained confessions. In so doing, members of
the Court agreed that a primary concern was to encourage observance of the law
by law enforcement officers, or at least discourage illegal or improper conduct by
them. However, it is interesting to note that, while Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice
Wilson emphasised that the burden lay on the accused to satisfy the court that illegally
obtained evidence should be excluded”, Justices Murphy, Dawson and Deane
suggested that illegal custody should generally result in exclusion. Justice Murphy
stated that ‘where a confession was obtained by unlawful or improper conduct. . .
the evidence should generally be excluded... Evidence obtained by unlawful or
13. id, 74.
14. See above.
15. But note that Murphy J stated at 84 that ‘when a person is unlawfully required to incriminate himself,
the evidence should be rejected in other than exceptional cases’.
16. id, 78—80.
17. French v Scarman (1979) 20 SASR 333, 341 — absence of stautory sanction made the South Australian
Supreme Court more willing to exercise its discretion.
18. R v Warneminde [1978] Qd R 371 where evidence of drug trafficking obtained by police entrapment
was admitted.
19. R v Byczko (1982) 7 A Crim R 263, 275 (SA CCA).
20. (1982) 57 ALJR IS.
21. id, 18.
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improper conduct should be almost automatically excluded on trials of minor offences,
but otherwise in trials for the most serious crimes’.22 Justice Deane noted that the
onus lay on the accused to persuade the trial judge to exclude the evidence, but
expressed the view that where a confession has been procured while the accused was
illegally detained, ‘special circumstances, such as the illegality being slight, would
commonly need to exist before the balancing of considerations of public policy would
fail to favour the exclusion of evidence of the confession’.23
The latest published view on this matter offered by the Australian Law Reform
Commission was contained in its 1983 Report on Privacy.24 It retained the reverse
onus exclusionary rule, to deal with the evidence obtained illegally in breach of the
proposed privacy standards. However the rule was reformulated so that the competing
public policies are stated in general terms.
As reformulated, the rule would provide that illegally obtained evidence was not
admissible unless ‘the desirability of having evidence relating to the offence before
the court substantially outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has
been obtained in the manner in which the evidence was obtained’.25 The Commission
is preparing an interim report on the Federal Law of Evidence which will also canvass
this issue. Without going into detail of a report not yet delivered to the Federal
Attorney-General it can be said that it is not likely to make any significant changes
to the balancing approach enunciated in the Privacy report.
The American ‘Revolution’
American law relating to unlawfully obtained evidence, once so apparently
absolutist to Australian eyes, seems to be moving in a direction similar to moves in
Australia. The precise decision of the Supreme Court in United States v Leon was
only that the ‘exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the
prosecutor’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance
on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found
to be unsupported by probable cause’.26 But the impact of the majority’s judgment
is likely to be much greater. Essentially, they resolved the question of admissibility
in the particular case by weighing the costs and benefits of exclusion. In a number
of recent cases the Supreme Court has been inﬂuenced by economic analysis of due
process to express requirements of the Constitution in cost/benefit terms.27 On the
one hand, the social costs of exclusion were seen to include interference with the
criminal justice system’s truth finding function and he collateral consequence that
some guilty defendants may go free.28 On the other hand, the majority Justices noted
that exclusion may serve the public interest of deterring such illegal cconduct and
preserving the integrity of the judicial process.29 They concluded that, where a Fourth
Amendment violation has been ‘substantial and deliberate’, exclusion was appropriate
in the ‘absence of a more efficacious sanction’. 39 But ‘when law enforcement officers
have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on... guilty defendants [by exclusion of the
evidence] offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system’.31 The Court did
22. id, 22.
23. id, 23, 26. See also Justice Dawson at 30.
24. Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 22, Privacy (AGPS, Canberra, 1983).
25. id, para 1170.
26. 52 Law Week 5155 (1984).
27. Cf Mathews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976). See HP Green, ‘Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the
Law: Introduction and Perspective' 45 0 Washington UL Rev 901, 910 (1977).
28. id, 5157.
29. The majority took the view that the latter issue is essentially the same as the former — exclusion which
has no deterrent effect is unlikely to encourage illegal conduct or damage the integrity of the judicial process.
(id, 5161; fn 22).
30. id, 5158.
31. ibid.
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however emphasise that the good faith illegal conduct of the officer must have been
objectively reasonable. This will require officers to have a reasonable knowledge of
what the law prohibits. 32
This rejection by the Supreme Court of the United States of a strict rule of
automatic exclusion of evidence obtained1n breach of the constitutional guarantees
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution reﬂects the view that
its benefits in protecting the rights of the citizen and deterring, to some extent,
government illegality are outweighed in some cases by its associated costs in political
hostility, manifest absurdity and injustice in the particular case and reduced crime
control. While a strict exclusionary rule always resolves the public policy conflict in
favour of one group of interests, thus taking the problem out of the hands of the
individual [unrepresentative, unelected] judge, and thus produces relative certainty
and predictability, it thereby lacks flexibility. It makes no allowance for different
circumstances and different degrees of illegality. Unconscious, accidental or trivial
irregularities are treatedin the same manner as deliberate and serious irregularities.
Evidence will be excluded even if the errant officer has also been punished1n another
forum. The court will not be able to take into account the fact that the evidence could
not have been obtained at all but for the impropriety or could have been obtained
quite readily and with perfect legality but for a momentary lapse.
Admittedly, any approach that is discretionary will tend to rely heavily on the
judgment of the individual judge. It also, by definition, lacks certainty of result. It
therefore sacrifices predictability to flexibility. Nevertheless, the conﬂicting concerns
in this area, and the wide variety of circumstances, necessitate such an approach.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada stated ten years ago that:
. there is an undeniable advantage in granting judges discretionary power,
since it keeps the courts continually in touch with current social attitudes and
may lead to the eventual evolution of the rules as the courts adapt them to
changing social realities. It gives to the courts the role of guardians of the public’s
freedom.33
Canada itself, with enactment of the Charter Rights and Freedoms (‘the Charter’)
on April 17, 1982, is now moving down the path of discretionary exclusion. Sub-
section 24(2) of the Charter provides:
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Residual Issues in the Discretionary Approach
Nevertheless, allowing for this general movement in Australia, Canada and the
United States towards judicial discretion in the admission of evidence unlawfully
obtained, it would be a mistake to think that no problems remain with respect to
illegally obtained evidence. The remainder of this paper will consider several difficult
issues that must be addressed:
Weighing ofBalance. The present Bunning v Cross discretion in Australia is an
exclusionary one. The onus is upon the accused to satisfy the trial judge that illegally
or improperly obtained evidence should be excluded. But the Australian Law Reform
Commission continues to take the view that the onus should be reversed, ie, that
the discretion should be inclusionary. The policy considerations supporting non-
admission of the evidence suggest that, once the misconduct is established, the burden
32. id, 5161.
33. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Study Paper No 5 Compellability of the Accused and the
Amissibility of his Statements (Ottawa, 1973) 27.
34. ALRC 2, para 298.
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should rest on the prosecution to persuade the court that the evidence should be
admitted. After all, the evidence has been procured in breach of the law or some
established standard of conduct. Those who infringe the law should be required to
justify their actions and thus bear the onus of persuading the judge not to exclude
the evidence so obtained. Practical considerations support this approach. Evidence
is not often excluded in Australian courts under the Bunning v Cross discretion. It
goes against the grain of trial judges brought up in the era of Kuruma to exclude
probative evidence that is probably reliable and usually highly damaging to the
accused. This suggests that the placing of the onus on the accused leans too heavily
‘on the side of crime control considerations, to the extent that unfairly obtained
evidence will rarely be rendered inadmissible. As the Australian Law Reform
Commission stated in its Interim Report on Criminal Investigation, ‘things will change
if the court has to find a positive reason for exercising its discretion in favour of
admissibility’.“ Further, factors relevant to exercise of the discretion include the
mental state of the law enforcement officers involved and the urgency under which
they acted. It would seem more appropriate that the prosecution have the primary
responsibility of showing that the officers acted in good faith, rather than the accused
.having to show the reverse —— the prosecution will have access to the relevant
information and witnesses. Similar arguments would support the proposition that
reasons for admission should ‘substantially’ outweigh exclusionary considerations.
Alternatives to Exclusion. The public interests supporting exclusion of illegally
or improperly obtained evidence tend to diminish in force if other effective mechanisms
are able to deal more directly with the illegality or misconduct. Thus, a trial of an
accused person is not always, by any means, the best forum to discipline errant law
enforcement officers. It is neither equipped to be, nor intended, as a full inquiry into
an officer’s conduct. More important, exclusion of the evidence may not penalise
the officer in any meaningful way. The deterrence value of evidentiary exclusion also
does not seem to compare well with more direct mechanisms. Empirical studies of
the deterrent impact of the US. exclusionary rule have been inconclusive.35 It is
arguable that the behaviour of law enforcement agencies is little inﬂuenced by judicial
decisions but conforms rather to the agencies’ standards even if the conduct is
‘technically’ illegal. The conclusion of a recent United States study was that even
in situations where the rule deters, it tends to do so in a negative fashion36 — for
example, officers fail to conduct a search or investigation at all for fear it may later
lead to the exclusion of evidence and possible acquittal. As well, the exclusionary
rule can apply only to a small proportion of cases of official misconduct. As the
English Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, in its 1981 Report, pointed out
in terms equally applicable to the Australian scene:
Only a minority of those who are, for example, stopped and searched by the
police are arrested, and a sizeable minority of those whose property is searched
are not charged. Of persons arrested a significant proportion is not subsequently
prosecuted. The overwhelming majority of those prosecuted plead guilty. And
only a proportion of those who contest their cases challenge the legality of the
police exercise of their powers. Further, the point at which any such challenge
occurs will be remote in time and effect from the incident giving rise to it.
Accordingly an automatic exclusionary rule can operate to secure the rights only
of a very small minority of those against whom a particular power has been
exercised and this must cause doubt about its effectiveness as a deterrent of
police misconduct.37
35. BC Canon, ‘Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument
for its Retention’ 23 S Tex LJ559, 572 (1982).
36. J Hirschel, Fourth Amendment Rights (New York, 1979) 99—100.
37. Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report, Cmnd 8092 (HMSO, London, 1981) para 4.125.
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As a remedy for infringement of human rights, exclusion of evidence obtained
is a haphazard approach. The benefit of exclusion may be wholly disproportionate
to the wrong suffered. The optimal solution would be one whereby the individual’s
rights were vindicated without exclusion of the evidence. To the extent that alternative
remedies are available and effective, they should be adopted. If they have been, and
they constitute a satisfactory vindication of the individual’s rights, exclusion would
be unnecessary. Similarly, the argument that the public will perceive judicial failure
to exclude improperly obtained evidence as indicating that law enforcement agencies
are not subject to the law diminishes in force if effective alternative methods are
available and used to discipline or control the police. Adoption of the extreme remedy
of exclusion, however symbolically satisfying, would seem unnecessary except in cases
of serious misconduct since exclusion carries with it the danger that people such as
jurors, victims, witnesses and the general public through the media will lose respect
for the law and the administration of justice when it appears to defeat a prosecution
on ‘technical’ grounds. It follows, therefore, that every attempt should be made to
develop effective remedies and for a review for law enforcement misconduct and that
the rules of evidence in this area should encourage the police themselves to take
responsibility for ensuring that individual officers act consistently with legal
requirements.
It has been argued that if it can be established that alternative remedies to exclusion
are available and are effective (either because they had already satisfied the relevant
public interests in the particular case or because they had proved effective in the past
at satisfying such interests in similar cases) illegally or improperly obtained evidence
should not normally be excluded at all. For example, if the prosecution failed to
establish their existence, it has been suggested that the judge could consider exclusion
of the evidence. Such an approach would require the trial judge to explicitly examine
the question. It would certainly provide an incentive to the government to provide
such alternatives, and make them effective. Where the prosecution satisfied the onus,
the trial judge would not need to consider any other questions. As a corollary, the
police and lawyers would benefit from the certainty that effective alternatives would
automatically end the argument that evidence should be excluded in the public interest.
This argument assumes, however, that the exclusion, with its disadvantages, is not
justified if effective alternatives exist, since the public interests favouring exclusion
have been satisfied. It rejects the argument that importance must nevertheless be
attached to the fact that the judicial system would still be tainted by the admission
of the improperly obtained reliable evidence however effective were the alternatives
available for discipline of errant officials.
There may be cases where evidentiary exclusion would be warranted even though
satisfactory disciplinary and compensatory procedures were clearly available. This
conclusion depends on the scope of the concept of judicial and executive legitimacy.
The misconduct may be so serious that the courts should have nothing to do with
the evidence despite its probative value and the ready availability of such alternative
procedures. The public interest may in some cases warrant the dual deterrent of
punishment and exclusion of the evidence. In serious cases, the remedies should be
seen as cumulative rather than alternative. Finally, the spectacle of the trial judge
examining the collateral issue of available forms of punishment of official illegality
in the midst of a busy criminal trial is not one that is instantly attractive to the average
Australian judge.
For all this, it seems clear that the provision of alternatives to evidentiary exclusion
is a necessary response to the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence and their
availability should be considered in the exercise of the judicial discretion. These
alternatives would include civil actions, criminal prosecutions, internal and external
disciplinary procedures, and possibly, direct disciplinary action taken by the trial judge.
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In the Commission’s First Report, Complaints Against Police38 it recommended that
the Commonwealth should assume responsibility for tortious actions and ommissions
by members of the Federal Police, proposed a draft disciplinary code and
recommended the establishment of an independent tribunal to investigate and
determine complaints against members of the Federal Policef‘9 The Complaints
(Australian Federal Police)Act 198] which came into force on 1 May 1982, provides
for: '
0 establishment of an Internal Investigation Division of police;
0 the Commonwealth Ombudsman to be a neutral recipient and, in some cases,
investigator of complaints with certain enhanced powers; and
0 establishment of a Police Disciplinary Tribunal, presided over by a judge.
The accompanying amendment to the Australian Federal Police Act provided for
liability in the Commonwealth for police wrongs in certain cirumstances. These
reforms have been copied, in substance or in part, in a number of Australian States.
Relevant Factors. What matters should a trial judge be expressly required to
consider when balancing the competing public interests? One method of minimising
the inherent difficulties in and potential idiosyncracies of the exercise of discretionary
power, and, to a certain extent, of avoiding the danger of too great a disparity between
legal decisions, is to indicate precisely the nature of the conflicting interests which
should be balanced and to list the factors which should be taken into account in the
exercise of the discretion. There is general agreement that factors such as the
seriousness of the misconduct, the mental state of he law enforcement officer, and
the existence of circumstances that required urgent action should be taken into
account. But uncertainty surrounds the relevance of other factors such as the probative
value of the evidence improperly obtained, its impOrtance in the trial“ and the
seriousness of the offence with which the accused is charged. An argument against
taking these last-mentioned considerations into account is that the law enforcement
agencies will modify their behaviour, depending on their presence. Thus, they may
theoretically believe that they can get away with murder in a murder investigation.
As Justices Stephen and Aickin stated in Banning v Cross, ‘to treat cogency of
evidence as a factor favouring admission, where the illegality in obtaining it has been
either deliberate or reckless, may serve to foster the quite erroneous view that if such
evidence be but damning enough that will of itself suffice to atone for the illegality
involved in procuring it’.“ The question is whether this danger justifies a balancing
test in which some, or all, of the factors supporting admission of the improperly
obtained evidence are excluded from consideration by the trial judge. This seems too
extreme an appoach. One solution would be to exclude them from consideration only
where officers have deliberately acted improperly — only then will consideration of
these factors affect the misconduct.42 But the converse view would be that to exclude
them at all is inappropriate. The question for the judge is whether the balance of
public interest favours admission. He should arguably consider all the factors on both
sides of the equation. The officers themselves, while they should avoid improper
conduct, will be faced with situations where the legal requirements are vague. It would
seem legitimate for them to consider these factors and to have their attention drawn
to them in police training.Safeguards might be provided by the uncertainty of any
exercise of the discretion, by inclusion as a factor on the other side whether the
impropriety was part of a wider pattern of misconduct, and the existence of other
places of review.
38. Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 1, Complaints against Police (AGPS. Canberra, I975).
39. id, para 264—7.
40. ie the extent to which other equally cogent evidence is available.
41. (I978) 14! CLR 54,79.
42. ibid.
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Ranking of Factors. An issue connected to that of the elucidation of factors
relevant to exercise of the discretion is whether some attempt should be made to rank
them in order of importance. Although United States law appears to be moving
towards something like the Australian position, it could be argued that theresult
of Leon is simply to introduce an element of discretion where the law enforcement
authorities acted in reasonable good faith and to retain a general rule of exclusion
in circumstances of intentional or reckless misconduct. It might be possible to structure
a public interest discretion in such a way as to make the mental state of the law
enforcement officers of central importance. This approach would serve the public
interest in deterring such misconduct, since evidentiary exclusion is not likely to deter
good faith illegality. But such an approach may also be too simplistic. Many factors
are relevant to the balance of public interest. Even a deliberate illegality might not
justify exclusion in a situation where the evidence could not have been obtained at
all but for the impropriety, or the offending officer has been severely disciplined,
or the evidence is crucial to the prosecution of a person charged with a very serious
offence. Conversely, exclusion of evidence improperly obtained, even if in good faith,
may be justified to encourage a law enforcement agency to educate its officers in
legal requirements, or because there seems to be a wider pattern of such misconduct,
or because the offence charged is minor. Good faith of officers seems an elusive
concept upon which to base such an important discretion. It will be hard to evaluate.
It will be difficult to disprove. It is subjective. And it may favour the ignorant and
insensitive but well-meaning official who does not bother to familiarise himself with
the requirements of the law. The introduction by the United States Supreme Court
of the concept of reasonable good faith may not be sufﬁcient to meet these objections.
Confessions. The High Court of Australia has held that the discretion to exclude
illegally or improperly obtained evidence extends to evidence of confessions.“3
The Australian Law Reform Commission has always taken the view that
the public interest discretion should apply to such evidence. The majority of the High
Court further considered that the pre-existing law relating to the admission of
confessions remained unaffected. But it may now be time for an attempt at
rationalisation. Under existing law, a confession is inadmissible if it is not shown
to be ‘voluntary’.“ Sub-categories of that test relate to the effect of ‘inducements’
and ‘oppressiori’. Even if ‘voluntary’, a trial judge has a discretion to exclude a
confession if, taking into account the circumstances in which it was made, it would
be unfair to use it against the accused.45 There is further general judicial discretion
to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect is likely to be greater than its probative
value“ and this may be used to exclude unsigned records of interview“7 or admissions
made by individuals who are mentally underdeveloped or under the effect of drugs.“8
The general public interest discretion is also applicable to confessions which have
been illegally or improperly obtained. Although it is not appropriate in this paper
to consider the question of confessions in detail, it may be time to separate clearly
the two fundamental issues in this context — evidentiary reliability and public interest
concerns. While the latter category covers, as described above, a number of different
concerns, this separation may enable rationalisation of the law relating to confessions,
with consequent improvements in terms of understanding, certainty and
predictability.‘9
43. Cleland v The Queen (1982) 57 ALJR 15.
44. McDermot! v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; Cleland v The Queen (1982)
57 ALJR 15.
45. R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133, 154.
46. Cleland v The Queen (1982) S7 ALJR 15, 29.
47. Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517.
48. R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9, 14—15.
49. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence Reference, Research Paper No 15, Admissions
(S Odgers).
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An additional problem is the scope of the concept of misconduct. The public
interest discretion comes into operation whenever evidence is illegally or improperly
obtained. Clearly, it is desirable to spell out with as much precision as possible what
law enforcement officers should not do in performing their functions. That was one
of the primary purposes of the Criminal Investigation Bill proposed by the Law
Reform Commission in its report on Criminal Investigation. But there comes a point
where particular methods used to obtain evidenCe, while not always acceptable in
every circumstance, should not be defined as illegal. This is particularly true in the
interrogation context. Intensive interrogation for several hours in an inhospitable and
uncomfortable environment cannot be generally prohibited. However,
there should be an opportunity for a court to find that a confession extracted in such
circumstances should in the particular facts of the case, be excluded on public interest
grounds. Some attempt should be made to define as clearly as possible situations
in which an exercise of the discretion may be considered.
Fruit of Confession. Yet another problem with imprOperly obtained confessional
evidence, although not exclusive to it, concerns evidence discovered as a result of
the confession. The traditional Anglo-Australian position has been that such evidence
is admissible.50 By contrast, under the American law’s doctrine of the ‘fruit of the
poisoned tree’, the exclusionary rule applied not only to the illegally obtained evidence
itself, but also to other incriminating evidence derived from that primary evidence.51
The basic justification for this doctrine was said to be the public interest in
deterring law enforcement authorities from violation of constitutional and statutory
protections. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court of the United States has only
recently also withdrawn from this strict rule. In Nix v Williams”, decided on 11 June
1984, the Court held that evidence pertaining to the discovery of a body was properly
admitted, notwithstanding the fact that the confession which led to it was obtained
in breach of the Sixth Amendment, because it would inevitably have been discovered
even if no violation of any constitutional provision had taken place. The High Court
of Australia has not decided whether the public interest discretion should extend to
such consequentially discovered evidence. The Australian Law Reform Commission
proposed in its report on Criminal Investigation that it should”, and it may be that
American law is moving closer to that position. The policy arguments which support
discretionary exclusion of a confession obtained improperly equally support
discretionary exclusion of consequentially discovered evidence. Clearly, a relevant
consideration in balancing the competing public interests would be evidence that the
‘fruit’ would ultimately have been discovered or obtained without any illegality or
impropriety.
Appellate Review. At present appeal courts in Australia accept limitations on
variation of a trial judge’s exercise of the Bunning v Cross discretion. The question
on appeal is whether the discretion was reasonably exercised, taking into account
all relevant factors and ignoring irrelevant ones.54 The appeal court does not
reconsider, the question and exercise the discretion itself. This is in contrast to rules
of admissibility, which are considered afresh. This judicial restraint has been justified
many times. It is said to derive from a number of factors:
0 the trial judge is usually said to be in a better position to decide how a discretion
should be exercised because he sees and hears the witnesses and follows all aspects
of the trial;
0 equally reasonable men may hold differing views on the exercise of such a
50. R v Warrickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263; 168 ER 234; R v Beere [1965] Qd R 370, 372.
51. Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States 251 US 385 (1920); Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 (1963).
52. 52 US Law Week 4732 (1984).
53. ALRC 2, para 298.
54. House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504—5; Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608, 619—20.
See also R Pattenden, The Judge, Discretion and the Criminal Trial (Oxford, 1982) 33—4.
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discretion; and
0 there is a danger of large numbers of appeals if full review of discretion is
permitted, with consequential uncertainty and delay in criminal justice.
An issue that needs to be considered is whether the present rule is appropriate
where a discretion involves consideration of matters of public interest, upon which
the general guidance of appeal courts may be useful in diminishing judicial
idiosyncrasy and in identifying and ranking competing aspects of the complex public
policies involved.
Conclusions
This paper has not attempted to deal exhaustively with the subject of illegally
obtained evidence. Many of the issues remain to be addressed. They include the extent
to which rules for the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence should apply in civil
as well as criminal trials. Is the risk to liberty and reputation so special in the criminal
trial that different and higher protections are needed? Another unexplored issue is
raised by recent events in Australia. '
If a situation is reached where the Prime Minister, the Federal Attorney-General,
the State Shadow Attorney-General, Judges and numerous other officials allege illegal
interception of their telephones,.is society simply to shrug this off? If the evidence
resulting from such interception is readily admitted in courts, Royal Commissions
or other inquiries, will this fact —— widely reported in the media — erode general public
confidence in the important value of the privacy of telecommunications? In short,
are there sometimes occasions or special circumstances where courts and tribunals
must vigorously enforce the law and insist upon the exclusion of evidence in order
to uphold perceived social values even more important than the elucidation of
significant facts?
Enough has been said to show that what is at stake here is the balance that results
from the competition between public policies. It is interesting to observe the extent
to which recent United States, Canadian and Australian authorities seem to be moving
towards a generally similar result. This result avoids the previous United States
tendency absolutely to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, in the name of keeping
pure the temples of justice and discouraging illegality on the part of officials of the
state whose very duty it is to uphold the state’s laws. On the other hand, it also avoids
the apathy and apparent indifference of the old English rule inherited in Australia
which, whilst asserting a residual right to exclude evidence, rarely did anything to
enforce that right, out of deference to the overwhelming attractiveness of probative
and relevant evidence.
The result of the present approaches in the three English-speaking federations
mentioned is that a judicial discretion must be relied upon to strike the balance. Judges
(whether in the United States, Canada or Australia) brought up in old ways will need
to be nurtured to an understanding of the competing public policies that are at stake
here. That is why law reforming bodies may do a public service by identifying more
clearly the judicial checklist. It is why legislatures may do a service by enacting such
a checklist for all to see. It is why appeal courts will perform their role in scrutinising
more closely the exercise of the discretion committed to trial judges and magistrates
in order to ensure the reduction of idiosyncrasy and the maximisation of the consistent
application of the declared public policy. ,
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
The Hon. Justice M. D. Kirby C.M.G.
Sir Edmund Herring Speaks
A few of you were at the service of Thanksgiving on Monday to commemorate
the centenary of the Law Society of N.S.W. Looking around this theatre, I can safely
say that not many of you were, doubtless being engaged in pieties elsewhere at that
early hour.
Those of you who were present will recall that the Third Reading was not from
either Testament of the Book but from something written by the former Chief Justice
of Victoria, Sir Edmund Herring and published in 1961. It was read by our Chief
Justice. In the midst of this passage, Sir Edmund asserted —
Throughout the nations that share the English inheritance the common law has
proved a satisfactory and flexible system, though naturally many changes have
been effected by Act of Parliament. The balance has been kept between the
interest of the State and the freedom of the individual. The basic freedoms. . .
[are] ultimately secured. . . by the establishment of an independent judiciary. . .
Today these same basic freedoms are enjoyed by many newcomers to our shores,
who have escaped from totalitarian regimes, where law is used as an instrument
of the State to strengthen its hold over the individual, and not as a means of
securing his freedom.
That is what this seminar is about: the balance between the interest of the State
(and, let it be said, the mass of people whom the State should represent) and the
freedom of the individual. The guardians of the balance are the Judges. But if the
balance is to be kept, the guardians must sometimes be assertive. They must do difﬁcult
things sometimes to powerful, opinionated and enthusiastic people.
Decision-makers, naturally, want to make their decisions on the best available
relevant material that can be placed before them in the reasonably available time for
decision. It is for that reason, that the mind of the decision-maker has to struggle
to exclude from contemplation, as a factor in the decision, probative and relevant
evidence. The community is probably impatient of the notion of excluding evidence
that is probative and relevant, however unlawfully it may be obtained. But the point
of my paper is that sometimes the courts have to vigorously enforce the law, even
to the point of excluding probative evidence in particular cases, in order to protect
important social values. My paper aims to state the current law in Australia. It seeks
to illustrate the ways in which the law in the United States and Canada are moving
in the same general direction as the law in Australia.
Four Recent Cases ‘ ,
The problem of excluding evidence that has been unlawfully obtained is not an
academic one. In recent weeks, in the United States, as in Australia, it has arisen,
actually or potentially, in at least four celebrated and highly publicized cases, only
one of which is mentioned in my paper —
0 The acquittal of car magnate John de Lorean in the United States in August
1984 following disclosure of various defects and illegalities in the prosecution’s
case. See “A case riddled with blunders” Courier-Mail, 18 August, 1984, 6
0 The decision of the United States Supreme Court in July 1984, reversing earlier
precedents, to allow police to prove the seizure of a large quantity of cocaine
following an anonymous tip off. This was permitted even though strict
procedures for obtaining a search warrant were not followed, because the Court
was satisfied of the “reasonable good faith” of the police.
The decision of the Federal Court of Australia in May 1984 that questions asked
of a solicitor Michael Seymour during an interview for a Federal offence were
 
 unfair and ought not to be admitted in evidence. Seymour v Attorney-General
(Cth) & Ors (1988)-53 ACR 513.
0 The so called “Age Tapes Affair”, with the suggestion of illegal telephone taps
by State police.
This last mentioned case illustrates, along with other recent instances, the
competition between social values. On the one hand, there is the clear value of getting
all relevant matter before the decision maker whether a judge or jury in court, a
Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry or a commissioner conducting an inquiry or
Royal Commission. On the other hand, there is a clear public interest to ensure that
public officials themselves comply with the law and that such general public values
as telecommunications privacy should be preserved and protected by the law.
If, for example, a situation is reached where the Prime Minister, the Federal
Attorney-General, the State Shadow Attorney-General, Judges and numerous other
officials allege illegal interception of their telephones, is society simply to shrug this
off? If the evidence resulting from such interception is readily admitted in courts,
Royal Commission or other inquiries, will this fact — widely reported in the media
— erode general public confidence in the important value of the privacy of
telecommunications? In short, are there sometimes occasions or special circumstances
where courts and tribunals must vigorously enforce the law and insist upon the
exclusion of evidence in order to uphold perceived social values even more important
than the elucidation of significant facts?
Four Approaches
In the course of my paper I point out that, putting it very generally, four
approaches have been suggested to the problem of dealing with evidence illegally
obtained by police officers or others —
0 In England, judges have asserted a “reserve” discretion to exclude such evidence
but it is rarely exercised.
0 In the United States, until recently such evidence was always excluded, no matter
how trivial the illegality or difficult the circumstances facing police.
0 In Australia, the High Court had emphasised the judge’s discretion to exclude
such evidence but left the onus on the accused person to persuade the court
that it should exclude the evidence. '
0 Finally, the Australian Law Reform Commission had urged reform of federal
laws to clarify the judicial discretion and list the grounds for its exercise. But
the Commission had urged that the onus should be reversed so that it was for
the Crown to prove that in the particular case the balance of social policy
warranted admission of the evidence.
As I have said, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have moved
closer to the Australian position. What is at stake here is the balance that results
from the competition between public policies. It is interesting to observe the extent
to which recent United States, Canadian and Australian authorities seem to be moving
towards a generally similar result.
This result avoids the previous United States tendency absolutely to exclude
unlawfully obtained evidence, in the name of keeping pure the temples of justice and
in order to discourage illegality on the part of officials of the state whose very duty
it is to uphold the state’s laws. On the other hand, it also avoids the apathy and
apparent indifference of the old English rule inherited in Australia which, whilst
asserting a residual right to exclude evidence, rarely did anything to enforce the right,
out of deference to the overwhelming attractiveness of probative and relevant evidence.
Reasons for Exclusion
Because of the difficulty which most non lawyers have in understanding the
exclusion of relevant evidence from decision making, I have endeavoured to collect '
some of the principal reasons that have been offered to asserting the public interest
25
in sometimes excluding illegally or unfairly obtain evidence or confessions. Those
reasons include —
0 The duty of the courts to deprive people guilty of getting evidence illegally of
the fruits of their unlawful conduct. ‘
0 The role of the courts in ensuring that public officials guilty of illegality are
disciplined and their illegality brought to official notice.
0 The function of the courts to deter future'illegality on the part Of public officials
and to uphold high standards among such officials.
0 The function of the judges to protect individual rights, even of persons accused
of wrongdoing.
0 The role of the courts in upholding the rule of law and restraining the over
enthusiastic executive government when it goes beyond the law.
The High Court of Australia has moved in the direction of the proposals made
by the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1975. These proposals were contained
in the Commission’s Interim Report on Criminal Investigation. This report has not
yet been implemented although two Bills (one by Attorney-General Ellicott and one
by Attorney-General Durack) were introduced during the Fraser administration.
However, as the Commission’s report was drawn up by Senator Gareth Evanswhen
a Law Commissioner, I think it is reasonable to expect that the report will be
implemented by the present Federal Government in due course. There are statements
of commitment to this end by Senator Evans himself.
Problem Areas
As I point out in my paper, the solution to the dilemma we are examining today
is not a simple matter of giving judges or Royal Commissioners a discretion to decide
whether to admit or exclude illegally obtained evidence, such as evidence obtained -
as a result of illegal telephone interception. A number of problems have to be
considered in any effective law reform on this topic ——
0 The onus of proof: should it rest upon the Crown to get the evidence before
the court or should it rest upon the accused who claims to exclude relevant
evidence?
0 Alternatives: given that many people plead guilty and others may not be in a
position to contest illegally obtained evidence, are there additional sanctions
against public official misconduct? Proposals of the Law Reform Commission
on the handling of complaints against police have been substantially adopted
in many parts of Australia.
0 Factors: the list of factors to be considered in assessing the exclusion of evidence
should be worked upon.
0 The weight to be given to different factors such as the deliberateness of the
misconduct, the urgency facing police, the seriousness of the illegality etc.
0 Whether evidence discovered as a result of the illegal activity (as distinct from
say the record of an illegal telephone interception) should be admissible.
0 Whether exercise of the trial judge’s discretion should be reviewed by appeal
courts in order to reduce idiosyncratic judicial decisions.
Competing Policies
Clearly there is a need for further consideration of this issue. The result of the
present approaches in the three English-speaking federations mentioned in my paper
is that a judicial discretion must be relied upon to strike the balance between the interest
of the State and the freedom of the individual. Judges (whether in the United States,
Canada or Australia) brought up in old ways will need to be nurtured to an
understanding of the competing public policies that are at stake here.
That is why law reforming bodies may do a public service by identifying more
clearly that judicial checklist. It is why legislatures may do a service by enacting such
a checklist for all to see. It is why appeal courts will perform their role in scrutinising
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more closely the exercise of the discretion committed to trial judges and magistrates
in order to ensure the reduction of idiosyncrasy and the maximisation of the consistent
application of the declared public policy.
It is also why we usefully collect today to examine the current law and to suggest
ways in which that law may be improved. ‘
0 The Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW). Note that s. 5 (2) (c) renders the use of listening devices without
warrant legal in these circumstances. The issue of unlawfully obtained evidence does not arise. Note
also that s. 13 (2) sets out the exceptions to the general provision that such evidence is inadmissible.
In particular, 5. l3 (2) (cl) provides for a discretion to admit such evidence in proceedings for an offence
which carries a sentence of twenty years or more or is a serious narcotics offence, that is to say an
offence under 5. 45A of the Poisons Act. Also to be noted in s. 13 (3) which sets out some specific
guidelines to be followed in the exercise of the discretion arising under s. 13 (2). This provision is broadly
consistent with the recommendations made in the Working Paper on illegally and improperly obtained
evidence published by the NSW Law Reform Commission in 1979. Note also that s. 13 (l) (b) incorporates
the concept of the ‘fruit of the poisoned tree’.
. See also Police & Criminal Evidence Bill 1984 (GB) and in particular the proposal by Lord Scarman
to amend the Bill to exclude from the trial evidence that has been improperly obtained unless the Court
is satisfied by one of two conditions: that the irregularity was of no material signiﬁcance or that ‘the
probative value of the evidence, the gravity of the offence charged and the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained’ was such that the fair administration of the criminal law required that the evidence
be given. See discussion of the English legislation in The Times 8 August 1984 12 (‘Lord Scarman has it’).
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THE PROBLEMS FOR THE INVESTIGATOR WITH ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE. ‘
Detective Sergeant N R Chad
Fraud Squad, Police Department N.S.W.
From the very outset of intial training, police are advised of the problems
associated with illegally obtained evidence and the ramifications associated with this
concept. Police generally address themselves to this issue in respect of confessions
and admissions as these are perennial problems confronting the investigation of crime.
In this paper, I propose to exclude this area, and discuss two aspects of crime which
may have dire consequences if not resolved. Almost constantly investigators infringe
upon the legislation in order to achieve a successful result, not in regards to a
prosecution, but primarily in order that the crisis may be placated without injury
or death to persons or property from damage. I refer to (i) hostage/siege situations
and (ii) extortion.
Unquestionably police have a duty to ‘protect persons from injury or death and
property from damage.’1 Coupled with this fact is an immunity for the participating
members for ‘any injury or damage caused by him’2 in the exercise of his duties
providing he is acting in good faith. Does the exclusion clause cover breaches of
legislation where no actual injury or damage, per se, is occasioned?
(i) Hostage/siege situation. -
Over the past years there has been a marked increase in the prevalence of
hostage/siege situations. The primary response from the Police Department is to
contain the incident and try and negotiate a peaceful solution. It is pleasing to note
that over the last one hundred incidents reported during the past year or so, no shots
have been fired by the police, and that each situation has been resolved through
negotiation.
The investigation that usually leads to some form of legal action follows the
cessation of hostilities, and is conducted by a separate force from the containment
element, although some of these members, naturally would give evidence at any
proceedings.
The types of persons who engage in this type of incident, as offenders, are:
(a) the criminal;
(b) the mentally disturbed personality; and
(c) the terrorist.
The science of negotiation was formulated in New York in 1973 and since that
time has proved to be the most efficient manner in which to resolve siege/hostage
situations. Negotiators are selected and highly trained in this field. They have an in-
depth knowledge of mental disorders, psychology, logic, communication techniques
and general police procedures. Many of the teams, in serious situations also have
the assistance of a psychological panel, who advise of the style of negotiation to
present.
In nearly each case negotiations are conducted by means of the telephone, from
the offender/s to the negotiator. The process of negotiation may endure for many
hours and sometimes days to pacify the situation, with the primary objective being
the resolution of the problem by peaceful means. It is essential that the negotiators
tape record the whole process, in order that they can analyse the mode of the
conversation and seek out salient points that detect a catalyst from which they can
operate for their benefit. This type of behaviour is in direct abuse of the
1. Police Regulation Act (1899) 5. 7A (1)
2. ibid, 5. 26A.
28
Telecommunications (Interception) Act (1979). Whilst there is provision3 for certain
persons to be exempt from the provision of this legislation, there is no avenue whereby
any legal process can be issued to nullify any breach.
Additionally at times in the same type of crisis we have used electronic listening
devices to intercept private conversations between offenders, who have hostages under
serious threat. Aided by this information we have been able to discern the conflicting
attitudes of the offenders, and in turn, coerce one of them to make decisions which
have resulted in the peaceful resolution of what could have been a tragic crime. The
time factor involved in these incidents does not often permit us to take the proper
steps to obtain a warrant, as required under the Listening Devices Act (1969). The
legislation was sacrificed on this occasion for the preservation of life, but this does
not rectify the conduct of the officers involved. In a particular incident the
conversation intercepted through the listening devices were not tendered in evidence,
as they were only as an intelligence resource, but in other incidents this may not apply,
particularly if the defence were made aware of the situation.
The art of negotiation is the most formidable weapon in the police armoury to
resolve the hostile situations involving the potential loss of life. It is essential that
the negotiation phase to be conducted through a media of privacy such as the
telephone, and further in order to properly evaluate the conduct of the intercourse,
it has to be recorded.
(ii) Extortion
Extortion and kidnapping are heralded by overseas law enforcement agencies
as the tools of the terrorist for the mid 1980’s. Already this impact has been made
upon many European countries, with success largely on the side of the perpetrators.
In this State in recent times we have witnessed many large scale extortions ranging
from the infamous ‘Mr. Brown’ case to the abominable Woolworths extravaganza.
In each case the extortionist used the telephone as his tool of communication to inject
fear into the recipient, and thus gain his financial advantage. These are two prominent
cases which were highly publicised throughout the world. Large airline companies,
multi—nationals and successful domestic enterprises have the nagging problem of
anonymous telephone calls ranging from bomb threats to flagitious extortion demands.
Whilst many of these organisations may tend to treat these matters somewhat lightly,
companies involved in the transportation of large quantities of people cannot afford
to take anything but a serious view of the problem. In each case a security alert is
announced so that other carriers might know of the threat. This in turn causes serious
inconvenience to commuters throughout Australia for the sake of an anonymous
telephone prankster. ~
Over the years there have been many successful prosecutions launched against
would-be extortionists in the State. The basis of the prosecution in nearly every case
was the spoken word over the telephone, which was taped by the investigating agency.
Whether the tape was produced, or a version given orally, the content of the demand,
was the nexus of the prosecution case. Again in each case investigators have breached
the legislation which forbids the interception of telephone calls. Similarly the federal
law does not encompass the resource to take such action, even though there is a serious
threat to life and property. There is no authority which can be issued under the Act,
which can legalise the conduct of the investigating agency.
This leads us to another vexed area, the issue of voice tapes. Whilst there is some
doubt as to the veracity of this forensic evidence, at the present time it may afford
in the future irrebuttable forensic evidence as to the identity of the caller.
Amidst the current swell to rebuff the spoken word, there is a strong tendency
towards the admission of cogent forensic testimony.
‘. 5.7 (4) supra.
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It is strongly mooted that in the near future even more stringent measures will
be outlined in a modified Listening Devices Act within this State. It would appear
that no provision has been made to provide any respite from the penalties incurred
by persons breaching these provisions, no matter for what reason.
Conclusion ' '
Whilst the actions taken by the police in attempting to prevent a possible calamity
involving human life and property, may at times breach the legislation in respect to
the interception of telephone calls and listening devices, this does not justify their
actions. Initially there is no conscious thought in adopting these measures as to their
evidentiary value in any resultant prosecution, however, there is no doubt that they
may be available for production if called upon.
With the prophecy of an increase in the incidence of terrorism throughout the world,
as well as violent crime generally, it is now time to reconsider the legislation, which
on the one hand provides for the protection of our civil liberties, but on the other
harnesses the prevention and detection of potential atrocities.
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Detective Sergeant N. R. Chad
My paper avoided a head-on confrontation with what are known as “police
verbals”, or illegally obtained evidence that people might ask about. The paper reports
on particular areas which are crimes of the 80’s, crimes of the terrorist. However,
before I go into that 1 would like to say that police officers are human beings, and
do face the trauma of victim identification. They do see the rape victim, the murder
victim, the assault victim, and there is a certain amount of empathy or sympathy
or emotion towards the victim. Some police ofﬁcers no doubt may indulge in obtaining
illegally obtained evidence, particularly as Justice Kirby said in the field of confessions
and admissions. Whether they do it wilfully and deliberately, or whether they do it
unwittingly or whether they deem it to be part of their job, is a question which is
unanswerable. '
I have studied in the United States. I went to the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia, and whilst there I worked with the police departments in about seven States.
The seizure doctrine they have in the US. is not a problem within the N.S.W. Police
Department. In some of our areas, whilst they may be deficient (as a police officer
looks at it) in relation to stop, search and detain, generally under the Firearms, the
Drug, the Poison Acts etc. police officers have sufficient power to avoid any
confrontation such as alluded to by other speakers Mapp v Ohio [367 US 643 (1961)].
The first area I want to discuss is hostage negotiation, which is a fairly new
concept of police work. It was developed in New York in 1973 and since that time
we have nearly put SWAT out of business, because they haven’t been shooting too
many! In the last 100 incidents over the last two years, all have been peacefully resolved
by hostage negotiation apart from the one at the Spit Bridge. Hostage negotiation
is a very intense programme and it is performed by specialist police officers who are
very devoted to the cause.
It is essential that some line of communication be established between the alleged
offender(s) or perpetrator(s) and the police negotiator. You have a situation of a man
who is distraught and probably mentally unbalanced who straps explosives to his body,
then plants himself in an office block, and puts 500 sticks of gelignite in a position
which will blow up the building and cause multi millions of dollars worth of damage
and possibly injury and death to people nearby. He is in an impregnable position
from any law enforcement agency and has the fatalistic approach or “death wish”
to kill himself at a certain time. The first priority of the police officers is to resolve
the situation peacefully so that no life is lost and no damage is occasioned. That is
part of their role and part of the statute of this State, that is their job and that is
the job they have to perform. The second issue in their mind (if it ever comes into
their mind) is the fact that some day they will have to go to court and produce the
evidence. But the primary object is the peaceful negotiation of the incident and the
only way that can be done is by hostage negotiation. The person is usually contacted
by telephone and a conversation conducted which is taped in direct contravention
of the Federal law. It has to be taped because we have to play it back to ourselves.
If you are talking to someone for ten to twenty hours you have to remember what
you say, you have to have psychologists or a psychiatrist to vet what you say so that
you don’t exacerbate the situation. If it comes off peacefully then the flaw in the
argument is that the investigators themselves put the case before the court, and they
have to get the negotiators to give evidence in court of illegally obtaining evidence
of a negotiation that took place over ten or twenty hours. It is essential that the tapes
are obtained and they are obtained illegally, there is no question about that.
The second area I want to discuss is the crime of terrorism which we have
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already seen in this State. I don’t want to be a sabre rattler but as yet we have not
seen much terrorism in this State, compared to Europe and other countries in relation
to extortion and kidnapping. But without giving away any facts extortion is amongst
us now, and you might read a by-line in a paper that “so and so was charged with
extortion”. Having been 011 a certain squad for a number of years and been successful
on a number of occasions in bringing persons to justice for that offence, we have
again illegally obtained evidence by taping telephone calls from a person who says
“There is a bomb on a certain plane to leave Mascot or now in flight”. It is essential
for the purpose of negotiating the situation that the phone call must be taped to
discover whether it is real or not, to find out all the vital evidence, accent, any
background noises, anything that could lead to the detection of the person in the
prevention of a forceful and atrocious crime. Again, the primary object is to placate
the situation and to resolve it peacefully; the secondary aim is only later to bring
the offenders before court. We have had a number of examples, the Woolworths
bombing, the Qantas hoax and many more, and I fear that by the end of this decade
you will find many more similar to that that have occurred in Europe and particularly
in Italy. .
On these occasions police have contravened the law. There is no provision in
any Act, Federal or State, to condone the actions of police in these circumstances;
but we do it and we go before the justices. We bring the case up, but we have illegally
obtained evidence whether it be given verbally or whether it be acknowledged before
the court or not. Fortunately, most people plead guilty anyway or they are sent to
some other institution which does not require them going before the court. However,
the day will come very shortly that police officers will be brought before the court
and ridiculed for resolving a situation, which could have resulted in the loss of life
and property, for having contravened the law wilfully — no doubt about it wilfully
and deliberately — irrespective of what the ramifications might be.
It is time for the judiciary and the Parliament to look ahead when they are
formulating the forthcoming Listening Devices Act and other Acts to take into
consideration that in extreme cases of public safety some consideration should be
given to the fact that police officers have not got the time to get a warrant from the
justice at midnight or when a plane is in the air but should have the power to act
and later to substantiate it before a justice.
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LEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE — ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSION
G.D. Woods, Q. C. PhD.
Deputy Senior Public Defender
Department of the Attorney-General, N.S.W.
I wish in this brief paper to refer to some of the important considerations which
arguably militate against the admission into evidence in criminal trials of illegally
obtained evidence.
My basic argument is that most of the consideration of this matter over the past
decade or so has been concerned with formulation of an abstract legal doctrine whereas
in truth the problem lies not so much with the formula itself (whatever it be) but
with the application of that formula in real cases.
It is generally acknowledged that there is a spectrum of positions which may
be taken in the formulation of a doctrine of law to govern the reception of illegally
obtained evidence. On the one hand, it may be said that all illegally obtained evidence
ought to be admitted, any sanction against the illegality involved in its obtaining being
left to other authorities than the criminal courts. The second extreme position is that
all illegally obtained evidence ought to be excluded because of the taint of its unlawful
provenance. The third position is that the appropriate legal doctrine is one which
allows a discretion in the court to exclude illegally obtained evidence in some
circumstances, depending on a variety of factors which may be considered relevant.
The law in Australia as represented in Bunning v. Cross (1977-1978) 141 C.L.R.
54, is a variation of the third position, that is, illegally obtained evidence may be
excluded in the discretion of the trial judge. There is reference in the judgment of
Bunning v. Cross to public policy, unfairness, the liberty of the subject, cogency of
evidence, deliberateness of the breach, and the nature of the offence charged. The
leading judgment of their Honours Stephen and Aickin JJ. refers to a process of
balancing the various considerations (p. 80). In the circumstances of that case, certain
illegally obtained evidence relating to a breathalyser was allowed.
As I see it, the problem is not so much the statement of a discretionary formula
but that judges rarely, if ever, exercise their discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence. In my view, judges and magistrates dealing with unlawfully obtained
evidence ought to take strong note of the fact that our system of law and justice
operates, as Dicey put it, on the basis of the “Rule Of Law”. Legality and compliance
with the law are regarded as fundamental factors whereby our social institutions are
legitimized politically. If in fact evidence is obtained in an illegal fashion and that
illegality is not punished in some manner, then to a lesser or greater extent the rule
of law is undermined.
The second related consideration is that if illegally obtained evidence is admitted,
and the sanction against the breach involved is left to other authorities than the court,
the brutal reality is that there will probably end up being no sanction at all. I believe
that however useful may be the investigative powers of the police Internal Affairs
Branch or the Ombudsman, or any other public officer vested with a jurisdiction
to deal with complaints against police, the only real sanction is the sanction of the
court declining to accept and act upon evidence obtained unlawfully. It is this sanction
alone, in my view, which can operate as a real deterrent against police excess.
Those who advocate the extreme position that all illegally obtained evidence
should be excluded from the courts must confront the problem of what has happened
in America where a great wave of criticism has been directed at the courts for allowing
merely technical legal breaches to vitiate the conviction of dangerous persons. No
doubt this is a risk which must be borne in mind as a general policy consideration
by those who exercise this sort of discretion in the criminal courts. However, it is
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not a consideration which ought to be allowed to so overwhelm all other considerations
so that judges and magistrates, in effect, refuse ever to exercise their discretion to
exclude in favour of the defence. As everyone knows who practises in the criminal
courts, the sad truth is that judges and magistrates rarely, if ever, exclude illegally
obtained evidence in Australia. Ireland’s case (1970) 126 C.L.R. 321, is one of the
very few cases reported where a court has excluded illegally obtained evidence. The
policy arguments for changing the legal doctrine in Australia more towards. the
American position ﬂow to a large extent from frustration by criminal practitioners
at the failure of the courts to use the discretion which the High Court has clearly
said they possess.
Generally, in my view, there must be a discretion, but so long as the courts
demonstrate the timidity they do in its use, there will be correspondingly calls for
changes of the law more towards the American position. In truth, what is required
is not a change in the law but a change in the practice and the attitudes of judges.
One related matter with which I wish to deal is the existence of a category of illegality
so gross and dangerous that, in my view, any evidence obtained in breach thereof
ought never to be admitted as evidence or, indeed, used for any purpose whatever.
I refer to evidence obtained by the use of illegal telephone taps and bugging devices.
The Commonwealth and the States have variously legislated to control tapping and
bugging. These statutes allow the use of electronic devices in limited circumstances
subject to various more or less strict controls. It is of course a value judgment but,
in my opinion, where persons go beyond the allowed limits in this area and obtain
material illegally by spying and prying upon people’s private business, the damage
likely to be done both to the individual concerned and to the community at large
is so great that there ought to be an absolute prohibition upon the use of such material.
There is a View that the technologies for intrusive surveillance are now so
sophisticated, so cheap, and so readily available, that citizens should simply accept
that their homes, their offices, their telephone conversations, their bedroom activities,
and the most intimate aspects of their lives are no longer private. According to this
view, we simply have to adjust to the social reality that people cannot expect to have
any more privacy about their affairs and businesses than did the citizens of 17th
century French villages.
This is a very hard notion for a community such as ours to accommodate. We
are used to privacy and we will not readily give it up. In my opinion, for what it
is worth, if illegal telephone tapping and electronic surveillance is to be accepted as
legitimate and the products of it are to be accepted as properly useable, that would
be a very dangerous situation indeed. It is likely to lead to both public and private
paranoia. Students of the clinical phenomenon of paranoia are aware that as
technology has changed over the centuries, those persons prone to feelings of
unfounded fear and danger, tend to adapt within their delusions the latest
technological developments such as wireless, television, laser beams, and so on.
Societies, like individuals, can become paranoid. It seems to be increasingly possible
in the modern world. Furthermore, sometimes the paranoid have real enemies.
In my opinion, both in the courts and other institutions no credence or legitimacy
ought to be accorded to unlawful electronic intrusions into the private lives of citizens,
and accordingly any such material offered as evidence should be flatly excluded by
the courts.
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Dr. G. D. Woods
It is very rarely that the Chief Justice in the Court of Criminal Appeal has to
deal with the sorts of cases that are being discussed today. Whatever be the rubric
or formula under which this problem falls in the courts very rarely in practice in New
South Wales or any other Australian jurisdiction is illegally obtained evidence
excluded. It is, in my view, sensible that the American Supreme Court has in this
respect recently come close to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s position
— whether this involves the attraction of a large object by a small object I don’t
know, but it seems to be a kind of reverse gravity. The Leon decision in effect legislates
in America the position that Mr Justice Kirby has referred to as having been
recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. But it seems to me that
whatever the formula be, the reality is that there is a lot of illegally obtained evidence
which comes before the courts one way or another. It would be desirable if judges
and magistrates were aware of that fact and acted upon it as they are entitled to do
under the discretion vested in them by the decision in Bunning v Cross. ,
I have a perspective about the criminal law which can be designated as ‘legal
realist’. Recently Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard University has written a book
called The Best Defence in the preface to which he sets out (not entirely whimsically)
a set of rules which apply, as he sees it, in the criminal law courts in America. You
might think that they more or less apply here, too.
“Rule 1. Almost all criminal defendants are in fact guilty.
“Rule 2. All criminal defence lawyers, prosecutors, and judges understand
and believe Rule 1.
“Rule 3. It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating the Constitution .
[substitute Judges Rules or Police Commissioner’s Instructions] than
by complying with it and in some cases it is impossible to convict
guilty defendants without violating the Constitution.
“Rule 4. Almost all police lie about whether they have violated the
Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants.
“Rule 5.\ All prosecutors, judges, and defence attorneys are aware of Rule 4.
“Rule 6. Many prosecutors implicity encourage police to be about whether
they have violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty
defendants.
“Rule 7. All judges are aware of Rule 6.
“Rule 8. Most trial judges tend to believe police officers who they know lie.
“Rule 9. All appelate judges are aware of Rule 8. Yet many pretend to believe
the trial judges who pretend to believe the lying police officers.
“Rule 10. Most judges disbelieve defendants about whether their Constitutional
rights have been violated even if they are telling the truth.
“Rule 11. Most judge and prosecutors would not knowingly convict a
defendant who they believe to be innocent of the crime charged or
of a closely related crime.
“Rule 12. Rule 11 does not apply to members of organised crime, drug dealers, -
career criminals, or potential informers.
“Rule 13. Nobody really wants justice.
Now in my view there is a great deal of truth in Rules 1 to 12. Rule 13 is
fundamentally wrong. The problem is not that nobody really wants justice; the
problem is that everybody wants justice, but people have different ideas about what
justice is and different ideas about how it is possible to go about getting it. The fact
is that police officers confronted with persons whom they know are guilty, or believe
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are guilty, are under enormous community pressure, and pressure from their own
experience and moral positions to “do something” about it. Very often doing
something about it might mean infringing various rules.
The American Supreme Court decision in Leon effectively means that the 1960’s
made about civil rights. However, it seems to me that it is not vitally important that
we in Australia change what the legal formula is (although I would be encouraged
if the Commonwealth government and the State goVernments did in fact adopt the
Australian Law Reform Commission recommendations). It seems to me that it is not
the formula that we need to address, but the reality of the behaviour (criminal
behaviour, police behaviour and judicial behaviour) which occurs. At the present
time there is a great deal of controversy about many aspects of the criminal law system
and the judicial system. There are people who take the view (and I am included
amongst that group) that this isn’t necessarily a bad thing, that the more we address
ourselves to the realities of things, then the more likely we are to solve the problems
that we confront. Now, I am not suggesting that the Dershowitz Rules are literally
true, but there is a great deal of truth in them. I urge those judges who deal with
criminal matters to look at the reality of the behaviour in question and to perceive
the option of excluding illegally obtained evidence as one which they ought in an
increasingly large number of cases to take.
I don’t believe that the option of excluding all illegally obtained evidence is
possible. The American experience over the last ten years is that it draws the law
into disrepute. There is a serieslof American television programmes, films, and books
recently about criminals getting off because they have broken minor parts of the law.
There must be a judicial discretion. But the courts are entitled to chastise those in
the enforcement professions, difficult as their job might be, for bending the rules,
and they should chastise them when they present what is clearly illegally obtained
evidence or illegally obtained confessional material.
My other point is that there are some types of illegally obtained evidence which,
it seems to me, it is dangerous to accommodate under any circumstances. I refer in
particular to evidence of illegal telephone tapping and illegal surveillance.
In my view, social paranoia in an era of increasing technological sophistication
is a danger that we ought firmly to guard against. There is a view which I have referred
to in my paper which those of you who have read recent publications in relation to
privacy might be aware of — that is, that in this day and age we have to recognize
that our behaviour, our lives, our bedrooms, our offices, are no longer private. It
is, according to this view, the case of the technological genie being out of the bottle
— we have to accept that we are now in much the same position in terms of privacy
as a person who lived in a 17th century French village (for example) where there was
in effect no privacy as we know it. Everybody knows everybody else’s business. I
think that we as a community will find it very difficult to accommodate ourselves
to that perspective. In my view illegally obtained telephone evidence ought to be not
used at all in the courts, nor by other official institutions. Now it is not merely a
question, as I see it, of protecting persons — I quote from a series which is rarely
referred to in the courts and even more rarely here. It is the Penguin Crime Series.
I refer to the Casebook of Sherlock Holmes and in particular “The Adventure of
the Veiled Lodger.” This is where Dr Watson is reciting the great collection of material
that he has obtained over the years, documentary material about Sherlock Holmes’
cases. He says:
There is the long row of Year Books that fill a shelf, there are the despatch
cases filled with documents, a perfect quarry for the student not only of crime
but of the social and official scandals of the the late Victorian era. Concerning
these latter I may say that the writers of agonised letters who begged that the
honour of their families or the reputation of famous forbears may not be touched
 have nothing to fear. The discretion and high sense of professional honour which
have always distinguished my friend are still at work in the choice of these
memoirs and no confidence will be abused. I deprecate however in the strongest
way the attempts which have been made lately to get at and to destroy
these papers. The course of these outrages is known and if they ar
e repeated
I have Mr Holmes’ authority for saying that the whole story concerni
ng the
politician, the lighthouse, and the trained cormorant will be given to
the public.
Whatever it was that the politician got up to with the trained cormorant, a
nd however
it may have related to the lighthouse, Watson never revealed. However
that sense
of discretion which he employed is a discretion which I think the law
and society
ought to recognize in relation to the category of evidence which can be obtain
ed from
electronic surveillance and particularly in the use of interception o
f telephone
conversations. There are provisions for the lawful collection of such evidence
in some
circumstances. Nelson Chad suggests that there is a problem with respect
to extortion
cases involving imminent threat to life and he could possibly have a poin
t. If I may
be so bold I suggest that the point he raises there could be looked
at by the
Commonwealth Attorney. As I see it there is a provision in the Telecommu
nications
Interception Act which may in fact save that sort of evidence. It is s.
7 (6) (c) but
perhaps it does need some consideration.
The new Listening Devices Act in New South Wales will in fact cover a
nd cater
for the situation that he refers to. Listening device evidence in the h
ostage type
situation will be admissible — s. 6 (2) where the communication or public
ation is
not more than is reasonably necessary in connection with an imminent threa
t of serious
violence to persons or substantial damage to property or a serious narcotics
offence.
The point that I am making is that there are provisions in this Act which ha
sn’t yet
been Proclaimed and in the Telecommunications Interception Act for th
e lawful use
of those devices. Perhaps it is important that the legality of police conduc
t ought
to be made clear by the statute (and it is something that perhaps should be
looked
at) but in general it seems to me that there ought to be a strong bias
against the
admission of this sort of evidence, indeed a prohibition on its use in cases
where it
is illegally obtained. Although generally I agree with the proposition in
the Law
Reform Commission Report and in the Leon case that there ought to be a di
scretion.
But more importantly, as I have said before, it is vital that the judiciary r
ecognise
the reality of the conduct with which they are dealing.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UNITED STATES CRIMINAL, LAW:
THE CONSTITUTION IS WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS IT IS
' Alan A. Ransom
, Senior Lecturer,
Macquarie University School of Law.
“Walter, be wise, avoid the wild and new!
The Constitution is the game for you.”
The Revolutionary 0r Lines to a
Statesman, (Rt. Hon. Walter Long)
G.K. Chesterton.
“We are under a ConstitutiOn, but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is.”
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
Elmira, New York, May 3, 1907.
Pertinent Provisions from the Constitution of the United States of America ‘ -
Article II
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. . .
Section 2. [1] The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;. . .
[2]. . . In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
Appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
[3] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. . .
Amendment 1 [1791]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. . . ‘
Amendment IV [1791] .
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment V [1791] -
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictiment of a Grand Jury,. . . nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
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Amendment VI [1791]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted With the
witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Amendment VII [1791]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
Amendment VIII [1791]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inﬂicted. . . '
Amendment XIV [1868]
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . .
Selected Issues
A. Entrapment
U.S. v Jannotti 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982),
a RICO and Hobbs Act case involving extortion in commerce. Part of the ABSCAM
paper. The case of the Greedy Philadelphians.
The entrapment issue is not of a constitutional dimension.
The objective test (what did the government do?) versus the subjective test (what
was the defendant’s predisposition?)
Main cases: Sorrells v U.S., 287 US 435 (1932)
Sherman v U.S., 356 US 369 (1959)
U.S. v Russell 411 US 423 (1973)
Hampton v U.S., 425 US 484 (1976)
Sorrells first recognised the defence of implanting a criminal disposition in the
mind of an innocent person. It was a jury issue.
Sherman distinguished between the “trap for unwary innocents” versus a “trap
for unwary criminals” and held the defence established.
Russell held the defence not of a constitutional dimension.
Hampton involved allegedly “outrageous” Government conduct. Note the
plaintiff has the burden to disprove the defence beyond a reasonable doubt see U.S.
v Watson, 489 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1973). The defence focusses on the defendant’s mind.
There is no due process defence unless a right of the defendant is violated.
Janotti says the defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction if he shows;
(i) evidence of government initiation of a crime, regardless of the amount of '
pressure; and
(ii) any evidence negating the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.
The trial court in Jannotti acquitted and dismissed because:
(i) the plaintiff offered too much money (i.e. it created the disposition);
(ii) defendants were not asked to do anything improper;
(iii) defendants were led to believe that if they didn’t accept the money, Philadelphia
would not get the hotel.
The Court of Appeals said:
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(i) as a matter of law, it can’t be held that the amounts offered ($30,000 and
$10,000) were too generous to overcome any possible reticence.
(ii) is simply wrong as a matter of law. It is a jury question, note the District Court
acquitted and dismissed in spite of the jury verdict. .
(iii)The Court of Appeals and the “Arab Mind”, the purchase of friendship. The
“jury could have found as it did.”
The entrapment defence may succeed if defendant has been enticed by the public
official to make the payment. E.g. U.S. v Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1957)
but see U.S. v Bocra 623 F 2d. 281 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 449 US 875 (1890).
All of these arguments can also be made in a due process context — violation
of some immutable and fundamental principle of justice. Rochin v California, 342
US 165 (1952) but it is a much higher burden.
The entrapment defence; admits all of the elements of the crime as well as the
requisite mens rea.
Notein Jannotti, the very interesting dissent by Aldisert, Cir J., and Weis, Cir
J. and especially at fn 6. “Nothingis more revolting to Englishmen than the espionage
which forms part of the administrative system of continental despotisms”, quoting
2 E. May, Constitutional History of England, at 275 (1863).
B. Eaves-dropping — the problem of the “beeper” warrant
These cases depend heavily on the individual facts, the chain of evidence, and
the presence or absence of separate and independent facts that would validate the
issuance of the warrant. It is closely related to topics (C) and (D) below.
U.S. v Karo, 52 LW 5102 (3 July, 1984) — this case illustrates the factual
complexity upon which these decisions depend and illustrates as well the Supreme
Court’s rising impatience with the technicalities of search and seizure cases such as
those discussed in (D) below. In Karo a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) official
learned that three respondents had ordered 50 gallons of ether from a government
informant who told them it was to be used to treat cocaine-impregnated garments.
With the consent of the informant, a “beeper” was put in a can of ether which
was then substituted for one of the informants cans, withthe consent of the informant.
The defendants picked up the ether which was followed to a house. It Was then moved
to two other houses and then to two commercial storage lockers, both rented by two
of the defendants. These lockers were monitored, with varying degrees of success,
with both entry tone alarms and video cameras. The ether was then removed by the
defendant and taken to two other houses in succession.
Based in part on the “beeper” information, the DEA got a warrant,‘ made arrests,
and seized the cocaine. The government appealed the suppression of the cocaine
(supressed on grounds that the warrant to install the “beeper” was invalid) but did
not challenge the invalidation of the first warrant (the warrant to install the beeper).
The Supreme Court held: '
(i) the installation of the beeper infringed no Fourth Amendment interest, as the
informant’ s consent was sufficient, and the transfer of the “beepered”can to
Karo was neither a “search” nor a‘ ‘seizure” as it did not:
(a) convey private information; or
(b) interfere with a possessory interest.
but .
(ii) the monitoring of a “beeper” in a private residence, a location not open to
visual surveillance, violates Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy.
but
(iii)the evidence should not have been suppressed, as the locating of the ether in
the second locker was accomplished without the “beeper” (by the smell
emanating from a specific locker) and because the ether was seen being loaded
on a truck. Thus, there was no Fourth Amendment violation while the
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“beeper” was in the truck. Therefore, the warrant, after striking the “beeper”
information, had enough other independent evidence to furnish probable cause.
See also U.S. v Knotts, 460 US 297 (1983), which however, did not decide the
question of whether or not the installation of a “beeper” violates the Fourth
Amendment if the buyer does not know it is there, nor whether the monitoring thereof
is illegal if it reveals information that could not be obtained visually.
See also, Oliver v U.S., 52 LW 4425 (1984). “Open fields” are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. '
The separate judgments in Karo make analysis more confusing. Justices Stephens,
Brennan and Marshall said that a “beeper” on an individual’s personal property,
is both a search and a seizure within the fourth amendment. Presumably then, to
them the “beeper” as an “informant” on personal property would be beyond the pale.
This however is complicated by the fact that what one “knowingly exposes to
the public” even in the home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. See Katz v U.S., 339 US'347, 351 (1967).
C. The Use of Informants
The close relationship among the questions of informants’ information, search
and seizure issues, and the exclusionary rule is illustrated by Illinois v Gates, 103
SCt, 2317 (1983), and its recent interpretation in Massachusetts v Upton, 52 LW 3822
(May 14 1984).
In Upton, a search pursuant to a warrant found stolen credit cards in a hotel
room. A few hours later an unidentiﬁed female called police to say there was a motor
home full of stolen goods parked behind the defendant’s house. The policeman
identified her as the defendant’s former girlfriend who, she said, wanted to “burn
him”. She admitted her identity. Based upon this, a warrant was executed, using
in its afﬁdavit, as well, prior burglaries, lists of stolen property, and other information.
A conviction resulted.
The Supreme Court took the opportunity in Upton to clarify its opinion in Illinois
v Gates, 103 SO 2317 (1983) (which in turn overruled Aguilar v Texas 378 US 108
(1964) and Spinelli v U.S., 393 US 410 (1969)).
Aguilar and Spinelli set out a two-pronged test as to what was necessary to support
an informant’s tip as the basis of a warrant:
(i) the infoimant’s basis of knowledge; and
(ii) the informant’s general veracity or specific reliability.
Gates rejected this as hyper-technical, and in view of the Massachusett’s court’s
interpretation of Gates the Supreme Court made clear in Upton that the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of probable cause was to be applied in the “totality of
the circumstances” and that the issue is now a question of whether or not there is
“substantial evidence” to support the magistrates issuance of a warrant. This is much
akin to the test used for the review of decision by an adminstrative agency, not the
review of a constitutional issue.
In effect then, there is no de novo scrutiny of the magistrate’s basis for issuance
of the warrant. Courts are to use a “deferential”, not a “grudging or negative”
attitude toward the magistrate’s judgment. See U.S. v Ventresca, 380 US 102 (1965).
In effect then, the exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961), has
been substantially limited, particularly when the above cases are analysed along with
those below.
D. Search and Seizure
The problems of search and seizure are intimately bound up with those of the
exclusionary rule of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). Miranda and its numerous
progeny stand broadly for the proposition that “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
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effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”.
While it may be that, as the Court said in US. v Ross 456 US 798, 822—823,
(quoting Robbins v California 453, US 420 (1981)) the “Fourth Amendment pro-
vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from pub-
lic view”, that is not what the Court gave. The result in Ross, and the deference to
magistrates adverted to in Gates above, bespeaks an increasing trend toward eliminat-
ing the ‘hypertechnicalities’ of search and seizure 'law. This was clearly the case in
overruling the Aguilar and Spine/Ii tests above.
If there is any doubt about this, see the “cost benefit analysis” employed in
US. v Leon, 52 LW 5155 (5 July 1984).
In Leon, an informant of unproven reliability told a California police officer
that two people he (the informant) knew were selling coke and meths from their house,
that he had seeen money there and that there were only small quantities of drugs
at the house, the remainder being kept elsewhere.
An extensive investigation and surveillance of people, automobiles and residences
ensued. One month later a warrant was issued based on the detailed activities in the
application. An indictment followed: motions to suppress were granted in part, the
court rejecting the Government’s “good faith reliance” argument. This was affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit, based on the Aguilar — Spinelli test discussed above.
The Supreme Court did not consider the case within the Gates test of the ‘totali-
ty of the circumstances” (discussed above). Indeed the Government did not seek review
of the lower courts’ determination that the search warrant was unsupported by prob-
able cause. It argued only for a “good faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule.
Starting with the statement that the Fourth Amendment “has never been inter-
preted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons”, (quoting Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 US 465 (1976)), the Court
embarked on a “law ’n order” and “cost benefit” analysis, grounded upon the idea
that the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defen-
dant’s rights which he has already suffered”. It is a general Fourth Amendment
safeguard, not a personal constitutional right, and the question of an exclusionary
sanction (in a particular case) is separate from whether police conduct violated a
Fourth Amendment right of the party seeking to involve the rule (citing Gates, above).
To make a long judgment short, the Court recognized the “good faith” excep-
tion, over three long and sometimes very bitter dissents.
Under Leon if a “detached and neutral” magistrate issues a search warrant and
acts in objectively reasonable reliance on the material in the affidavit when so doing,
the warrant will be valid, even if ultimately it is determined that there was no proba-
ble cause to issue the warrant.
The same is true if there is a “technical error” in the issuance of the warrant,
Massachusetts v Shephard, 52 LW 5177 (5 July 1984). Clearly, this ﬂies in the face
of long-cherished (at least “cherished” by some!) US notions that one of the valid
purposes of the criminal law is to raise “technicalities"_against the criminal prosecu-
tion power of the state.
Even an unlawful entry is no longer ground for suppresion on the basis of un-
reasonable seizure. In Segura v U. S., 52 LW 5128 (July 5, 1984), the government
had information prior to the entry that would have been a reasonable independent
source for a warrant, according to the court. One may then well ask that if that were
so, why the police felt it necessary to obtain information 'via a break-in?
These are only a few of the more recent cases on these issues. See also US v
Jacobson, 52 LW 4414 (1984), Welch v Wisconsin 52 LW 4581 (1984) Berkemer v
McCarthy, 52 LW 5023 (July 2, 1984), US v Ross, 456 US 798 (1982), Manson v
Braithwaite 432 US 98 (1977), Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981), Salem
l—.m
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v Stumes, 52 L W 4307 (February 29, 1984), California v Beheler 51 L W 3934 (1983),
Rhode Island v‘ Inness 446 US 297 (1980), California v Trombetta, 52 L W 4744,
(June 11, 1984) (the “Bad Breath” case). '
Other Interesting Issues . .
The above are just a very few current issues in the development of United States
(criminal law. As a very small indication, what about the following: ‘
Is there a “public safety” exception to a warrantless search? NY v Quarles, 52
L W 4790 (June 12, 1984). - ‘ ‘
Is a requirement that a defendant report to a probation officer “custody” for
Fifth Amendment purposes if defendant confesses to a crime? Minnesota v Murphy
‘52 L W 4246 (February 22, 1984). ‘
What is the government’s responsibility for an arrestee’s medical care? City of
- Revere v Massachusetts General‘Hospital 103 S Ct 2979 (1980)? »
When and how may a prison inmate’s 'cell be searched? Hudson v Palmer, 52
L W 5052 (July 3, 1984). ‘ ' ,
What are the ambits of an Eighth Amendment “proportionality review” of
capital crimes? 52 LW 4141 (January 23, 1984). -
What rights of access does the press have to criminal trials? The Globe Newspaper
Co v Superior Court, 102 S Ct 2613, (1982) Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia,
100 S Ct 2814 (1980)? - . '
, Is the death penalty by definition “cruel and unusual punishment”? See eg Greg
.v Georgia 428 US 153 (1976)?
' To what extent may luggage be “bugged”? 'U.S. v Place, 51 L W 4844 (1983)?
What is the constitutionality of prosecution on the basis of a “pattern of crime”?
Coia v US, 719 F; 2nd 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (cert filed).
It should be more than clear that there is enough to keep lawyers busy — and
potential defendants concerned. ‘
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PRESENTATION OF DISCUSSION PAPER.
Alan A. Ransom
I am not going to dwell on my written remarks so much as I am going to try
and develop very quickly the unexpressed theme around which they were written.
Greg Woods mentioned to you Alan Dershowitz’s Rule number I and I might use
that to set my theme. That is that I am not so much concerned with the “cosh in
the night”, as it were, as what I perceive to be the more difficult problem of so called
“political crimes”.1
As I see it, the ebb and flow of criminal law and criminal jurisprudence in the
United States reflects more the politics of the public view of criminality. I might say
that for me, by the time the police bring a run of the mine, let’s say, murder case
(or something like that) to the Bar perhaps one can say that person is probably guilty
because there is a tremendous amount of prosecutorial discretion. The greater
difficulty is in the area of political crimes. In this connection one might, if one were
a cynic, paraphrase Clauswitz and say that law is simply politics by other means,
or perhaps Finlay Peter Dunn and say that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns. The question is really whether or not this is a good or a bad thing. I am
going to argue very briefly that it is a good thing.
The reasons are twofold. On the public level we have again, as Greg Woods
mentioned, the concept that “They got off because of a technicality” and, of course,
one gets into legitimate arguments about whether or not the purposes of technicalities
is to interpose those technicalities between the power of the State and the individual.
I think that is a legitimate argument and I think that is what those “technicalities”
are for. .
On the political level however, going back to the days of Richard Nixon, we
see something a great deal different. I hope you will forgive me a sense of deja vu
if two or three days ago I woke up to hear on the news that the Prime Minister is
being quoted as saying “I am not a crook”. Exactly the same words that Mr Richard
Nixon used. I am sure that there is no parallel because a lot of people have forgotten
that Mr Nixon was perhaps the world’s most famous unindicted co-conspirator.
Mr Justice Kirby spoke of a balancing of interests. I would like to think that
it is sort of a balloon theory — the balloon is a good analogy for lawyers because
hot air helps both — if the Constitution encloses the whole thing it is pushed sometimes
this way or that way but however its shape is changed, it is still basically a balloon,
with the same contents. We are seeing now in the United States Supreme Court a
push against what we might broadly call defendant’s rights. I would like to believe
that perhaps the balloon responds by being distorted (or compensated if you will)
in a different direction. We see this in a trend now toward conservative government.
We see it in other areas that we call “conservative” i.e. deregulation of industry,
so on and so forth. ‘
I think the Supreme Court responds to that on the popular level and more so
perhaps on the political level. Take John de Lorean. I think it is quite clear that in
that instance the people said “You can go this far but that you cannot do”. They
came to the opposite result with regard to the ABSCAM trials, for example, where
the FBI were using the same tactics with politicians. Politicians supposedly are
different. But what do you do when a politician stands before a Congressional
1. Subsequent discussion suggested this should be defined. 1 agree. For this general discussion I define
a “political crime" as one committed primarily for political rather than personal or pecuniary motives.
An example would be the break in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office by the White House plumbers
in the “Watergate” era.
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Committee and says that he can employ Executive privilege on behalf of every
employee in the Federal government?
Question: Does that include a Grade II postal clerk?”
Answer: “Yes”.
At that point you very seriously have to ask yourself how the Constitution
balances those interests. I think the Court perhaps does it on an ad hoc basis over
time. That does not bother me. It bothers those perhaps who are used to a different
sort of system. It can get meaner if one goes back to a different sort of system. It
can get meaner if one goes back to the time of Joe McCarthy, who conducted an
avowed witch hunt. When one comes to the use of illegal search and seizure techniques
in an avowedly political context (the Ellsberg example referred to in an earlier footnote
for example) then you have a situation that paints at its starkest that line between
what I would call street crime and the much more serious area of political crime.
This is the area that for me is a much more important and a much more difficult
topic to solve. I think Greg Woods and some of the other speakers, have touched
upon some of the solutions. I am not going to canvass them again.
My last thought is that it seems to me that there is an increasing interest both
in Australia and in the United States with regard to what I would call genteel crimes
or what Ralph Nader terms “crimes in the suites”. The Janotti case for example was
a Hobbs Act and a Rico Act case. Some of my friends are betting as to when the
first anti-trust case is going to be brought against one of the United States’ more
infamous recidivist anti-trust violators with an allegation that this is a “pattern of
racketeering”. This is particularly in derision of the courts which have held that a
“pattern” means “more than one”. I got today from the US Department of Justice
ten complaints. Only one is a request for equitable relief. The other nine are
indictments — criminal indictments for price-fixing. Most of them on the so called
“Operation Road Runner” scheme where the Department of Justice is uncovering
bid-rigging for Federally funded highways.
I leave you with the following little thought. Several of the speakers mentioned
the problem of altered testimony. “Dropsy” evidence, so-called, evidence of what
the police saw the defendant doing and so on and so forth. There is a little story
about the young lawyer who was crossing the street and who was unfortunately hit
by a bus and killed. He went to Heaven (of course, all lawyers go to heaven), and
St Peter had his papers that had been duly filed beforehand, and St Peter looked
at him and said “Well, my gosh, it is good to see you. We have been waiting for '
you for a long, long time. You have worked awfully hard all your life; how did you
manage to do it?”. And the lawyer looked at him and said “Well I don’t understand,
St Peter, I am only 35”. St Peter looked at him and said “Oh really. According to
your firm’s billing sheets you are 142 years old”.
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DISCUSSION PAPER 2
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF SOME SEARCH AND
SEIZURE QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES1
Henry di Suvero B.A. (Berk.)
‘ J.D. (Harvard)
Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law ,
University of New South Wales
Introduction
The United States is a federal system with a national or “Federal” government
and also fifty State governments. Each government has its own executive, legislative
and judicial system operating under its own separate Constitutional framework.
The Federal Constitution has a Bill of Rights which was adopted sometime after
the national government was created and consists of a series of ten amendments to
the Constitution. The “rights” are phrased as a set of restrictions on governmental
action and reflect the aim of the framers to have a government which would not repeat
the oppression they had experienced under the British administration of George III.
The US. Supreme Court (comparable to the High Court of Australia) interpreted
the Bill of Rights for many years as restricting only Federal, and not State government
activity. However, beginning in the twentieth century, the Court began a long, slow
and creative process of judicial interpretation making key or “fundamental” rights
in the Bill of Rights apply also to State activity. Among those “fundamental” rights
were freedom of speech and assembly, the right to counsel, the right against self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The impact of those decisions on criminal practice in the United States has been
enormous. The application of Federal rights to State proceedings meant that State
prosecutors and State police agencies had to comply With “higher” Federal standards.
Ninety per cent of criminal prosecutions are conducted in State courts and ten per
cent in Federal courts; any Federal standard that is requuired in a State court
necessarily has a ninefold multiplier effect.
Furthermore, in the late 1950’s the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief
Justice Warren, also embarked on a vast expansion of the rightsthemselves. The
Warren Court generally overhauled criminal procedure in the United States expanding
defendant rights and establishing higher standards of natural justice. Today, the Court
under the leadership of another Chief Justice, Warren Burger, is moving in the other
direction, tilting very decidedly towards the protection of public security interests
and cutting back on many of the Warren Court’s decisions.
Unreasonable Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment to the US. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and effeéts shall
not be violated by unreasonable searches and seizures and no warrant shall issue,
but on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized.
  
l. The paper has been written for a lay audience. It does not pretend to be definitive in any area and
many subjects are not touched on at all. For instance, standing questions, the doctrine of illegally tainted
evidence (“fruit of the poisonous tree”), searches by private individuals and the civil-criminal distinctions
are not even mentioned.
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Like the other Amendments to the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment does
not expressly say what should happen if it is violated, nor how the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is to be vindicated if it is violated. Typically
when a right is violated, the violator is sued either for damages or for injunctive relief
by the person who is injured. When there is an illegal search and seizure, the culpable
party would be the police officer and/or their employers, the police departments.
If the interest is purely personal, individual vindication of an injury usually suffices.
However in the search area, the interest is seen as not only that of the individual
whose privacy is violated. There is also a societal interest ensuring the privacy of
all citizens is not violated except in a constitutionally prescribed manner. To protect
that larger societal interest in privacy and security, another device was widely embraced
in the United States: the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from court proceedings.
In 1914 the Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained through a search and
seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in Federal Courts
(Weeks v US. 232 US 383). This “exclusionary rule”2 applied only to Federal, and
not to State prosecutions. In 1949 the Supreme Court decided the core value protected
by the Fourth Amendment, “the security of one’s person against arbitrary intrusion
by the police — was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and as such enforceable
against the states. . .” (Wolf v Colorado 338 US 25, 27). But Wolf did not take the
further step of requiring the State courts to adopt the exclusionary rule of Weeks,
which still applied only in the Federal courts.
However in 1961 the Court decided in Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 that the Federal
exclusionary rule of Weeks would also apply to the State courts. Overnight the Mapp
decision drastically changed all State prosecutions involving the seizure of evidence.
Despite the handwriting on the wall, which Wolf represented, State police agencies
and prosecutors did not change their ways. They continued to do what they had always
done: to introduce into State courts illegally seized evidence. That evidence was
routinely accepted. Mapp however meant the exclusionary rule now applied to the
States and that evidence could no longer be received in State courts.
Justice Brennan describes Mapp’s impact in this way:
Although specific empirical data on the systemic deterrent effect of the
rule is not conclusive, the testimony of those actually involved in law enforcement
suggest ‘that, at the very least, the Mapp decision had the effect of increasing
police awareness of Fourth Amendment requirements and of prompting
prosecutors and police commanders to work towards educating rank and file
officers. For example. as former New York Police Commissioner Murphy
explained the impact of the Mapp decision
“I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect. . . I was immediately caught
up in the entire program of reevaluating our procedures, which had followed
the Defore rule, and modifying, amending, and creating new policies and new
instructions for implementing Mapp. . . Retraining sessions had to be held from
the very top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot patrolman.”
(Murphy, ‘Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem
of Compliance by Police Departments,’ 44 Tex. L. Rev. 939, 941 (1966)).
Further testimony about the impact of the Mapp case was a shock to us.
We had to reorganize our thinking, frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to
take out search warrants. Although the US. Constitution requires warrants
2. There are other “exclusionary rules” designed to exclude evidence unconstitutionally secured under
other provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, an accused’s admissions secured in violation of his/her
Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel or against self-incrimination are excludable. e.g. Malloy v.
Hogan 378 US 1 (1964); Massiah v. US. 377 US 20l (1964).
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in most cases, the US. Supreme Court had ruled that evidence obtained without
a warrant — illegally, if you will — was admissible in state courts. So the feeling
was, why bother? Well, once that rule was changed we knew we had better start
teaching our men about it.” (N. Y. Times April 25, 1965 at 50,- col. 1.) A former
United States Attorney and now Attorney General of Maryland, Stephen Sachs,
has described the impact of the rule on police practices in similar terms: “I have
watched the rule deter, routinely, throughout my years as a prosecutor. . .
(Police-prosecutor consultation is customary in all our cases when Fourth
Amendment concerns arise). . . In at least three Maryland jurisdictions, for
example, prosecutors are on twenty-four hour call to field search and seizure
questions presented by police officers.” (Sachs. ‘The Exclusionary Rule: A
Prosecutor’s Defense’, 1 Crim. J. Ethics 29, 30 (1982)). See also LaFave, ‘The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and
“Good Faith” ’, 43 U. Pitt L. Rev. 307, 319 (1982): Merten & Wasserton. supra
at 394-401.
US. v Leon 52 USLU 5155 (July 5, 1984), (Brennan, J., dissent) 5170
footnote 13.
The rank and file of New York City’s finest were quicker than their Police
Commissioner. Like all their brothers and sisters in uniform across the country they
quickly changed their testimony when they testified in connection with the contraband
they had seized. The new cases became colloquially known as “dropsy” cases. Pre-
Mapp the officers, in a run of the mill drug case, would candidly testify they
“approached the defendant, searched him and found a bag of heroin in his left front
pocket”. They would offer no reason for the search, nor did they have to. However,
after Mapp any evidence secured through an illegal body search would be excluded,
and so a search without “probable cause” to believe a crime was in progress would
be an “unreasonable”, or illegal search, and the contraband seized would then‘ be
excludable. To circumvent Mapp andthe application of the exclusionary rule, the
police simply changed their testimony. Post Mapp testimony saw police testifying
with straight faces and under oath that “as they approached the defendant, the
defendant reached into his pocket and threw down into the gutter a plastic glassine
envelope which I retrieved. Knowing the same to be heroin, I immediately placed
the defendant under arrest.” The legal reason for the new testimony, improbable
as it sounded, was simple: seizure of an “abandoned” article did not constitute a
Fourth Amendment violation because the owner no longer had any possessory interest
in it; and the narcotics officer still had testimony connecting the contraband to the
defendant. “Dropsy” testimony was accepted by some judges but rejected as
“implausible” by others.
In Terry v Ohio 392 US l (1968) the Supreme Court sanctioned a police “stop
and frisk” of a suspect during a rapidly unfolding street encounter. Before Terry
the Court had never upheld the search of a person without “probable cause”; body
searches were only justiﬁed subsequent to an arrest (which required “probable cause”).
In Terry a police officer with over thirty years experience observed two men who
seemed to be casing a store for a robbery. When a third man joined them, the officer’s
suspicions were aroused and he approached them, asking them to identify themselves.
When they replied unintelligibly, he spun one around, frisked the man’s outer garments
and felt a bulge, which turned out to be a pistol. “Balancing’ ’ the need to investigate
against the intrusiveness of the invasion, the Court upheld the “stop and frisk” on
a safety rationale. To justify the stop the officer had to have a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific facts that “criminal activity may be afoot”, 392 US at 30, and to
justify the frisk, the officer had to suspect the person was armed and dangerous.
Like the “dropsy” cases, police officer testimony was tailored to meet the
Terry requirements. Suddenly pushers on back street footpaths no longer dropped
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their contraband at the feet of narcotics detectives, but instead would be seen “to
be looking furtively about, use a telephone booth to make a call, then wait outside
until another person arrived.” The defendant invariably had “a conversation with
the second person while looking into a store window.” “Having a suspicion of criminal
activity” on these facts, the officer would approach the defendant “see a bulge in
his front left pocket, believe it was a weapon that was concealed,” and “being in
fear of his own safety” would then “stop and frisk” the defendant.
These are just two examples of the principal way in which the exclusionary rule
has been circumvented: by tailored police testimony designed to make the illegal search
legal. '
Suppression Practice in State Courts
In California it is standardpractice for the defense to orally make a pre-trial
“motion to suppress” when the case first comes on and in any case where there is
an arguable issue of illegal search and seizure. The motion usually involves a contested
hearing where differing versions of the seizure of the contrabandd or articles are
elicited from the seizing officers and from the defendant. The prosecution, once the
legality of the seizure is challenged, has the burden of showing the search was legal
and so presents its evidence first.
The defense bar views the suppression hearing as a test of their ability to unmask
police testimony which is usually tailored to whatever is the latest controlling opinion
on the issue involved. The large discretion given the hearing judge to assess credibility
means that judges can, and often do, shape prosecution policy through their
suppression decisions. For instance, given the volume of defendants charged with
small amounts of cannabis in the 1960’s, judges began to suppress more and more
seizures of small quantities of cannabis. This, together with other factors, resulted
in major modifications in the area of marijuana possession law. The large discretion
thus provides a vehicle under which judges can and do shape policy, but it is the
“exclusionary rule” which nevertheless has to take the blame.
When the seizure has been pursuant to a warrant, the motion is one to “controvert
the warrant”, and the issues are legal rather than factual. The contest is usually over
the sufficiency of the affidavit which was initially filed to secure the warrant;
sometimes there is an issue of the warrant’s formal validity or whether the seized
items fall within the scope of the warrant. The defense also tries to compel disclosure
of the ubiquitous “confidential and reliable informant” who usually has supplied
the “information” upon which the officer swears out the affidavit. Once the identity
of the informant is ordered to be disclosed, the case is usually dropped. The
prosecution rationale is that it is more important to keep the informant’s identity
secret than to secure the conviction. The defense bar widely disbelieves the existence
of many purported “confidential and reliable informants”, but there is no way to
gauge the extent of police fabrication that is involved in this process.
The suppression hearing is usually dispositive in a contraband case, and in order
to save court time, an interlocutory appeal is allowed from the judgment on the pre-
trial motion by either side. If the appeal by a defendant is lost, there is almost always
a guilty plea. Unless the prosecution appeals a suppression order, it will ordinarily
dismiss the case.
In a judicial system where one third to one half of the criminal caseload is either
contraband or article related, the suppression motion is a central feature of the criminal
calendar. Search and seizure law in the States is therefore highly technical, encrusted
with rules and boasts a vast bibliography all of its own.
Wiretap and Eavesdrop Practice
Unlike contraband or article evidence, the existence in the prosecution brief of
either eavesdrop or wiretap evidence may not be known to the defense. Most
jurisdictions provide some avenue for the defense to secure pre-trial disclosure of
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such evidence. At least the prosecutor must disclose what “admissions” of the
defendant are intended to be used and thus, a wiretap may be disclosed. Once such
disclosure is made there will be a “motion to suppress” the admissions and a hearing
will be conducted not only on the threshold issue of the tap’s authenticity, but also
to determine the legality of the eavesdrop or wiretap; these issues are both statutory
and constitutional in dimension.
Katz v. US. 389 US 347 (1967) held the Fourth Amendment protected an
expectation of privacy in communications. Since then electronic surveillance has
generally been conducted under the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (1968) 18 U.S.C.A. s. 2510 et seq. The Act basically tries to fit
electronic surveillance into a search warrant mold, making wiretap and eavesdropping
legal only when it is conducted pursuant to a court order and under a detailed reporting
procedure. When the interception is over, the parties are to be notified of the
surveillance order, although for “good cause” notification can be delayed longer
(18 U.S.C.A. s. 2518 (8)). The procedure can be invoked in both State and Federal
courts (18 U.S.C.A. s. 2516 (2)).
When divulged, the legality of the interception is always questioned in a hearing
which is similar to a contest on the legality of a search warrant. Under Alderman
v. US. 394 US 165 (1969) the accused is entitled to disclosure of all the surveillance
which he has standing to challenge. If not admitted or disclosed, the defendant might
still file a discovery motion seeking to compel the prosecution to search its records
and file a responsive answer. Some courts require little by way of a defendant showing
in order to compel a search; others require more. Usually allegations of interference
on the line, frequent repairs and the like suffice. Minimally the defendant usually
must disclose what numbers s/he believes have been the subject of a tap.
The adequacy of the prosecution’s reply usually becomes the subject of a hearing.
The reply affidavit is typically bland, executed by the “chief investigating officer”
on the case, and states that “to his knowledge no electronic surveillance was used
to collect any evidence or leads to evidence in this case”. The defense effort is to
determine which agency or section actually does conduct the surveillance and to have
the records of that agency or section searched; also to have the officials of the agency
or section execute the answering affidavits. In such hearings there can be a wholesale
unravelling of the'government’s varied electronic surveillance apparatus.
In the late sixties the political anarchist group, the Weatherman/Weather
Underground were the subject of a series of criminal prosecutions. Almost all of them
were post Alderman, supra, and were dismissed on the prosecution’s motion on the
return date of the electronic surveillance discovery motion. The government preferred
to have dismissals entered rather than to disclose what everyone believed were
widescale illegal electronic surveillance practices.
The Burger Court ’
The “law and order” forces had conducted a long political campaign against
the Warren Court, seeing in its decisions the reason why crime rates continued to
steadily rise. The dismantling of those decisions was an avowed aim of both President
Nixon and Reagan, and their six appointees to the bench have worked a drastic change
in the Court’s attitudes in many areas, not the least of which has been the search
and seizure area. (See, Wasserstrom, 8.1., ‘The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment’, 21 American Criminal Law Review 256 (1984)).
In the last week of the 1984 term, in a series of five decisions, the scope of the
Fourth Amendment’s restrictions and the rule excluding illegally seized evidence were
substantially eroded. Massachusetts v. Osborne 52 USLW 5177 (July 5, 1984) (7—2)
(Exclusionary rule does not apply to articles seized under formally defective warrant);
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza (July 5, 1984) (6-3)
(Exclusionary rule does not apply to “civil” deportation proceeding, applying a “cost
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benefit” analysis); Segura v. U. S. 52 USLW 5128 (July 5, 1984) (5-4) (Seizure while
waiting for warrant’s issuance not “unreasonable” seizure despite admittedly illegal
entry; “independent basis” for warrant’s issuance places seizure outside of “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctine); U.S. v. Karo 52 USLW 5102 (July 3, 1984) (7—2)
(Beeper planted in delivered article not unreasonable intrusion into private dwelling).
U.S. v. Leon 52 USLW 5155 (July 5, 1984) was the week’s most wide sweeping
opinion. In Leon, the Court, in a 6—3 decisioin decided the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule can no longer be used to bar the admission of evidence illegally
seized because the applying affidavit for a search warrant was constitutionally
deficient. So long as officers act in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued
by a detached and neutral magistrate, even though the warrant is constitutionally
invalid, the evidence will be admitted. Under Leon evidence seized under an illegal
warrant will be admitted as a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The opinions of Justice White, writing for the majority, and Justice Brennan
for the minority, reflect the major arguments on the issue of the continued retention
of the exclusionary rule. Justice White sees the rule as a “judicially created remedy”
(52 USLW at 5157) designed to deter illegal police behaviour. Where the police act
reasonably, there is no justification for applying the exclusionary rule. On the other
hand, Justice Brennan views the rule as designed to protect the fundamental interest
of privacy and personal security and not grounded on a police deterrent rationale.
A more direct answer may be supplied by recognizing that the Amendment,
like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, restrains the power of the government
as a whole; it does not specify only a particular agency and exempt all others.
The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that
constitutional rights are respected.
When that fact is kept in mind, the role of the courts and their possible
involvement in the concerns of the Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus.
Because seizures are executed generally has utility in our legal system only in
the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission
of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the
initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence,
the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action
prohibited by the terms of the Amendment.3 Once that connection between the
evidence-gathering role of the police and the evidence-admitting function of
the courts is acknowledged, the plausibility of the Court’s interpretation becomes
more suspect. Certainly nothing in the language or history of the Fourth
Amendment suggests that a recognition of this evidentiary link between the police
and the courts was meant to be foreclosed.‘ It is difficult to give any meaning
at all to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if they are read to proscribe
only certain conduct by the police but to allow other agents of the same
government to take advantage of evidence secured by the police in violation
of its requirements.5 The Amendment therefore must be read to condemn not
only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy —— which is done, after all,
for the purpose of securing evidence — but also the subsequent use of any
evidence so obtained.
The Court evades this principle by drawing an artificial line between the _
constitutional rights and responsibilities that are engaged by actions of the police
and those that are engaged when a defendant appears before the courts.
According to the Court, the substantive protections of the Fourth Amendment
are wholly exhausted at the moment when police unlawfully invade an
individual’s privacy and thus no substantive force remains to those protections
at the time of trial when the government seeks to use evidence obtained by the
police.
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'I submit that such a crabbed reading of the Fourth Amendment casts aside
the teaching of those Justices who first formulated the exclusionary rule, and
rests ultimately on an impoverished understanding ofjudicial responsibility in
our constitutional scheme. For my part, “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures” comprises a personal right to exclude all evidence secured by means
of unreasonable searches and seizures. The right 'to be free from the initial
invasion of privacy and the right of exclusion are co-ordinate components of
the central embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Such a conception of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment was
unquestionably the original basis of what has come to be called the exclusionary
rule when it was first formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914).
There the Court considered whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment by a United States Marshal could be admitted at trial after the
defendant had moved that the evidence be returned. Significantly, although the
Court considered the Marshal’s initial invasion of the defendant’s home to be
unlawful, it went on to consider a question that “involves the right of the court
in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and
correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence without his
authority, by a United States Marshal holding no warrant for the. . . search
of his premises.” Id., at 393. In answering that question, Justice Day, speaking
for a unanimous Court, expressly recognized that the commands of the Fourth
Amendment were addressed to both the courts and the executive branch:
“The effect of the fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power
and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses,
papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under
the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime
or not, and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory upon all
entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures. . . should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.” Id., at 391—392.
The heart of the Weeks opinion, and for me the beginning of wisdom about
the Fourth Amendment’s proper meaning, is found in the following passage:
“If letters and private documents can. . . be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and [federal] officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. The United States
Marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed
with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution. . . Instead, he acted
without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further
proof to the aid of the Government, and under color of his office
undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation of the
constitutional prohibition against such action.. . . To sanction such
 proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if
not an open defiance of the prohibition of the people against such
unauthorized action.” 232 U.S., at 393—394.
That conception of the rule, in my View, is more faithful to the meaning
and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and to the judiciary’s role as the guardian
of the people’s constitutional liberties. In contrast to the present Court’s
restrictive reading, the Court in Weeks reccognized that, if the Amendment is
to have any meaning, police and the courts cannot be regarded as constitutional
strangers to each other; because the evidence-gathering role of the police is
directly linked to the evidence-admitting function of the courts, an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights may be undermined as completely by one as by the
other.
52 USLW at 5164—66 (Brennan J ., dissent) (footnotes omitted).
Justice White’s majority opinion advances a “cost-benefit” analysis of the
exclusionary rule relying on the following data:
Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects of
the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study suggests
that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of between 0.6%
and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, ‘A Hard Look at What
We know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary
Rule: The N11 Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests’, 1983 A.B.F. Res.
J. 611, 621. The estimates are higher for particular crimes the prosecution of
which depends heavily on physical evidence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to
nonprosecution or nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges
is probably in the range of 2.8% to 7.1%. id, at 680. Davies’ analysis of
California data suggests that searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all
felony arrestees, id, at 650, that 0.9% of felony arrestees are released because
of illegal searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id at 653,
and that roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal
because of illegal searches. id, at 654. See also K. Brosi. ‘A Cross-City
Comparison of Felony Case Processing’ 16, 18-19 (1979): Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States. Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on
Federal Criminal Prosecution 10—11, 14 (1979): F. Feeney, F. Dill & A. Weir,
Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur and Why 203—206 (1983):
National Institute of Justice. The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study
in California 1—2 (1982): Nardulli. The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Empirical Assessment. 1983 A.B.F. Res. J. 585-600.
The exclusionary rule also has been found to affect the plea-bargaining
process. S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice: The Problem of Illegally
Obtained Evidence 63 (1977). But see Davies, supra, at 668—669: Nardulli, supra,
at 604-606.
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the
exclusionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they
deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the cases
against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures. “[A]ny rule of
evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and reliable evidence
must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the
circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring offical unlawlessness.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US at — (White, J. concurring in the judgment). Because
we find that the rule can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of
situations under consideration in this case, see infra. at 17—22, we conclude that
it cannot pay its way in those situations.
52 USLW at 5157, footnote 6.
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Justice Brennan’s dissent answers the majority in this way:
In a series of recent studies, researchers have attempted to quantify the
actual costs of the rule. A recent National Institute of Justice study based on
date for the four year period 1976-1979 gathered by the California Bureau of
Criminal Statistics showed that 4.8% of all cases that were declined for
prosecution by California prosecutors were rejected because of illegally seized
evidence. National Institute of Justice, Criminal Justice Research Report —
The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1 (1982). However,
if these data are calculated as a percentage of all arrests that were declined for
prosecution, they show that only 0.8% of all arrests were rejected for prosecution
because of illegally seized evidence. See Davies, supra. at 619.
In another measure of the rule’s impact —— the number of prosecutions that
.are dismissed or result in acquittals in cases where evidence has been excluded
— the available data again show that the Court’s past assessment of the rule’s
costs has generally been exaggerated. For example a study based on data from
9 mid-sized counties in Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania reveals that motions
to suppress physical evidence were filed in in approximately 5% of the 7,500
cases studied, but that such motions were successful] in only 0.7% of all these
cases. Nardulli. The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 585, 596. The study also shows that
only 0.6% of all cases resulted in acquittals because evidence has been excluded.
Id. at 600. In the GAO study, suppression motions were filed in 10.5% of all
federal criminal cases surveyed, but of the motions filed, approximately 80—90%
were denied. GAO Report, supra. at 8,10. Evidence was actually exluded in
only 1.3% of the cases studied, and only 0.7% of all cases resulted in aquittals
or dismissals after evidence was excluded. Id. at 9—1 1. See Davis, supra at 660.
And in another study based on data from cases during 1978 and 1979 in San
Diego and Jacksonville, it was shown that only 1% of all cases resulting in
nonconviction were caused by illegal searches. Feeney, Dill & Weir, Arrests
Without Conviction: How Often They Occur and Why (1983). See Generally
Davies, supra, at 663.
52 USLW at 5169, footnote ll
Davies, author of the American Bar Foundation study on the National Institute
of Justice report which is cited. by the majority opinion, calls the NIJ report
“misleading and exaggerated”. The report’s data analysis is “not a valid measure
of the [social] costs of the rule” according to Davies. (The National Institute of Justice
is the research arm of the Department of Justice, or the federal prosecutor’s office.
The 1982 NIJ report, based on Caifornia data, found that the exclusionary
rule was responsible for 4.8 percent of all rejected felony arrests. That figure
has been routinely quoted by those opposed to the exclusionary rule, including
the US. solicitor general, in an amicus brief in Gates. Davies does not dispute
the accuracy of the figure. The problem, he says, is that it measures the wrong
thing. .
The NIJ figure, according to Davies, is only suitable for comparison with
other factors leading to the rejection of a felony arrest, such as the failure of
a complainant to appear in court. Since the NIJ analysis measures exclusionary
rule factors against the pool of rejected arrests, the “costs” of the rule would
vary with other, unrelated factors.
The proper test for the costs of the exclusionary rule, Davies says, is to
measure the number of arrests rejected because of the rule as a percentage of
all arrests. Measured without regard to other factors, the costs would vary only
with the total number of arrests. Using this formula and the same data as the
NIJ, Davies calculates the costs of the exclusionary rule to be much lower —
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- 0.8 percent of all felony arrests, a figure more in line with previous government
studies of the issue.
Many lawyers and journalists have misread the NI] study, believing it to
measure what Davies says it should. Both Time and the New York Times
Magazine have stated, wrongly, that the NI] figure represents the percentage
of arrests rejected because of the exclusionary rule, not a relative measure of
one cause for arrest rejection. “I gathered that the NI] study was very partisan,”
Davies says, adding that the NI] figure “has more rhetorical appeal for attacks
on the exclusionary rule than the correct calculation.”
California Lawyer, v.4 n.6, p.19, June 1984.
There is, of course, no data collecting the total number of illegal searches-
conducted, because of the total searches conducted, only those that turn up contraband
or other evidence will ever become the subject of further analysis.
There are different ways to read Leon. Leon can be given a limited scope,
authorizing the admission into evidence of only items seized under a warrant of some
large degree of colorable legality, and where the police acted methodically in executing
it. Or it can be read against the backdrop of the Court’s other opinions as signalling
an open season on the exclusionary rule itself.
Leon’s effect may, however, be limited by the converse side of federalism as
judicially interpreted in the United States. The high court of each State is free to
interpret its own constitutional guarantees, and with respect to its interpretations on
matters of state law, its decisions are “final”. State high court decisions resting on
a “state” and not a “federal” ground are thus, not reviewable1n the Supreme Court.
As the Supreme Court begins to water down the Warren Court federal standards,
the defense bar is now relying more and more on developing “independent state
grounds” which can‘be asserted in State courts. The purpose is to avoid Supreme
Court review, especially in some notably liberal jurisdictions such as California and
New York, and to hold the line against the current Supreme Court trend. The
exclusionary rule’s erosion might, therefore, be substantially stayed in a sizeable
number of state jurisdictions.
Conclusion .
The current trend of the US. Supreme Court is to cut back on the exclusionary
rule’s application in the search and seizure area. This trend rejects the police deterrence
rationale for the rule, and finds the rule’s “cost” outweighs its “benefits”
Supporters of the exclusionary rule not only factually contest the empirical data
used to construct a “cost-benefit” analysis, but also contend the rule properly
implements the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against illegal searches and seizures,
because all government bodies, and not just the police are governed by it.
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PRESENTATION OF DISCUSSION PAPER
‘ ‘Henry di Suvero
I have very little to add in addition to my paper, but I would like to contrast
a couple of factors that I think distinguish American practice in this area from the
practice here in Australia.
First and foremost the American guarantee against illegal search and seizure is
contained in a Bill of Rights. It is of constitutional dimension, not only for the Federal
government but also in all State constitutions. Each State has a separate constitutional
charter and in those charters there are separate Bills of Rights, reﬂecting the same
rights as contained in the Federal Bill of Rights.
Unlike Australia where all criminal trials are basically tried in a unitary system,
in the United States we have two systems of courts, one of which is the Federal court
system and the other, the various State court systems. The Federal courts handle about
10% of the criminal business. Most of that is white collar crime, or very prominent
kinds of crime that the Federal Bureau of Investigation likes to prosecute (like
kidnapping), and the other 90°70 (or the run of the mill kind of criminal prosecution)
is done in the State courts.
What has happened in terms of the evolution of the exclusionary rule in the United
States is that the Federal exclusionary rule has been applied to State trials. That was
the decision in the Mapp case of 1961. Now, the exclusionary rule as it is talked about
in the illegal search and seizure area sounds somewhat arcane. I teach Evidence and
one of the things I continually am aware of is that the Law of Evidence is really a
system of rules as to what is included and what is excluded from court. It is not such
a strange animal to have an exclusionary rule. The problem in the area of search
and seizure is that the items of evidence are always tangible, always real, and therefore
any question of reliability basically doesn’t exist. It is not like the confession area
where there is always a problem as to how reliable that piece of evidence is, so you
may develop an exclusionary rule to keep out involuntarily secured confessions. Here,
however, the evidence is always “good” in the language of both prosecutors and
defence lawyers. It’s “real” evidence and almost always critical, and that is what
the fight is all about. If you have very “good” reliable evidence why don’t you let
it in? That basically seems to me the argument that is being discussed.
In the United States before the Burger court, it was understood, at least from
the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the Constitutional guarantee that
prohibited illegal searches and seizures also included an exclusionary rule in the Federal
courts, i.e. any evidence that was illegally seized could not be brought into court.
The theory behind that was the Constitutional guarantee not for the particular
defendants involved, but was for society’s benefit. It sought to ensure that not too
large an invasion of privacy and intrusion into people’s houses would take place.
That guarantee was ﬁrst created at the end of the American Revolution. It was created
in reaction to the kinds of police tactics that the constabulary of George III actually
exercised in their time. That was the history of the genesis of that amendment —
the Fourth Amendment.
Now, if you look at it as the Burger court looks at it today, in a “cost—benefit”
analysis, which Mr Justice Kirby refers to in his paper, if you look at it in the sense
of weighing the “cost” of dismissing prosecutions against defendants that are actually
caught with the goods as opposed to proceeding with the prosecutions, then it seems
to me that you always come down on the side of the prosecution. And that’s because
you want to have the “benefit” of putting these people away. However, if you take
the larger societal view of the three Justice dissent in Leon, you will come to a
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different conclusion.
The dissent was written by Justice Brennan, who interestingly enough had been
appointed by President Eisenhower, while the majority opinion was written by Justice
White, who was an appointee of President Kennedy. Although you have what appears
to be on the surface a shifting of roles, nevertheless the majority behind Justice White’s
opinion are all Reagan and Nixon appointees.
What you have in Leon is a contest between the notion that it is only the police
that are to be deterred, as opposed to the notion that all the different organs of
government have to participate in the protection of privacy. In effect what the majority
has said “If the police err or if the magistrate who issues the search warrant commits
an error that is alright, and we will let it in so long as the error wasn’t too big”.
That is basically the reading of Leon. The affidavit in support of the search warrant
according to the majority opinion was constitutionally defective. It was a bad search
warrant, but because a magistrate issued it, then it becomes alright for purposes of
avoiding the exclusionary rule. What Leon means is that if the police put together
an affidavit that is insufficient they can nevertheless use the evidence that they seize
~ because a magistrate has placed his name on top of it and signed the warrant.
The problem with the Burger court I think is really its reasoning as to what interest
is being protected. It is not the defendant’s interest that is being protected, it is the
whole society’s interest that is being protected. Whether Australia will move in this
direction will not depend on a rule directed to a judge’s discretion. The problem with
a judge’s discretion, as I see it, is that a judge is always in a hard position of deciding
whether or not to exclude a piece of evidence. It only becomes important when the
evidence is important, and at that point a judge really has to be enormously courageous
in order to exclude the evidence. It is much better to have a societal agreement reﬂected
in a Constitution or a Bill of Rights that says invasions of privacy in the area of homes,
or however you want to phrase it, shall not be tolerated by any form of governmental
activity, whether it be by the police, or whether it be by the courts. You make an
agreement to that effect and have it enacted as a Constitutional guarantee; then all
the judge has to do is to say, “All I’m doing is reﬂecting the basic consensus in that
constitution. All I’m doing is implementing that consensus by excluding the evidence”.
The problem with the discretionary approach, as I see it, is that it doesn’t answer
anythingnlt puts the judge really in a hot seat, that is every time that he exludes
evidence he is going to be criticised for letting the criminal go free because that is
always the result. What you can have by having a Constitutional guarantee is really
a protection for the judiciary; the judiciary then can say “This is the agreement of
society. It’s not me that’s doing it as an exercise of my discretion. I am just
implementing something that society itself has done before.”
I would like to add two additional comments. One is with respect to the Detective
Sergeant’s comment about the wire tapping — I think that if you devise some kind
of provision that allows the receiving party or “one party consent” to a telephone
intercept there shouldn’t be any problem. In other words when one person speaks
to another you have got to expect that the other person might be in a position of
recording you because that is the risk you take. If you had the one party intercept
rule then you wouldn’t have a problem with respect to that.
The other comment is that, with all due respect Dr Woods, I don’t think that
the exclusionary rule is now officially “dead”. The reason for that is that there are
a lot of State Constitutions and a lot of State courts that do 90% of the criminal
business in the United States. All those State Constitutions have an illegal search and
seizure provision. If a State court interprets and excludes evidence based on a State
Constitution then that is considered an “independent State ground” and therefore
that decision is not reviewable in the US. Supreme Court. What the defence Bar
is now doing is resurrecting these State Constitutional guarantees and what you
 are going to see is a lot more State decisions that are'going to be much more liberal
than the Supreme Court’s and that is going to hold the line until the composition,
at least from my viewpoint, hopefully will change in the US. Supreme Court.
J
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DISCUSSION
Professor R. W. Harding, Director, Australian Institute of Criminology
The first thing I would like to .say is a one party intercept rule would put
Telecom out of business. Moreover, I cannot think of anything more inclined to
produce the kind of social paranoia that Dr Woods was talking about.
I am very glad Mr Justice Kirby referred — obliquely enough to be reconcilable
with the high office he is about to assume — to recent events in Australian public
life, and that Dr Woods and that Detective Sergeant Chad each referred to the
question of telephone tapping. It seems to me that a debate in 1984 about illegally
obtained evidence will be deficient if it does not take into account these deplorable
recent events. The single most important aspect of this debate has always been the
question of the exclusion of evidence. The Law Reform Commission report in 1975
argued convincingly that there should be a reverse onus discretionary exclusion rule.
I would like to quote from it, for I think it was an excellent document and has
survived very well.
Rights without remedies may be no more than rhetoric, duties without
sanctions for their breach may as well not be imposed. (A.L.R.C. 2 para. 287)
A virtual non exclusionary rule such as our own tends to encourage
illegality and hence reliance on illegally obtained evidence rather than other
evidence. The State should not profit from its own wrong. This can only
weaken general respect for the law and the administration of justice. (A.L.R.C.
2 para. 296)
In his second reading speech introducing the 1981 Criminal Investigation Bill
the then Attorney General, Senator Durack, highlighted the reverse onus exclusion
rule whilst tying in the criteria for its application to the case of Bunning and Cross
which had been decided by the High Court after the 1977 Bill had been introduced.
The 1977 and ’81 Bills each provoked very widespread discussion, though perhaps
it could be said that an unfortunate tendency developed for this to be dominated
by civil libertarian lawyers on the one hand and traditionalist policemen on the ‘
other, and it turned into something of a bear garden at one point. The press on the
whole gave the Bills a good reception, however. The primary importance of the
suggested exclusionary rule was generally perceived correctly. If the substantive
rules were to represent the appropriate equation in the relationship between
Executive and citizen, then those rules must genuinely be able to be enforced. Rules
which are observed principally in their breach are not really rules at all as the Law
Reform Commission had pointed out.
Let me pause there and stress that it is a discretionary rule being proposed, and,
even without amending the various Telecommunications Interception Acts, 1 would
have thought that the examples that Detective Sergeant Chad referred to could be
coped with within the proposed reverse-onus discretionary exclusionary rule.
A newspaper which had an excellent reputation for contribution to debates of
this sort was The Age (Melbourne). With regard to the 1977 and 1981 Bills it lived
up to its reputation. However, if — or perhaps I should say when — the present
Federal government introduces a 1984 or a 1985 version of the Criminal
Investigation Bill the question will arise “How can The Age appropriately now join
in the debate?”. I would suggest that the only posture it could consistently — albeit
dishonourably — take would be to argue that the Rules can and should be broken
with impunity; that evidence, of whatever kind and however obtained, should not
only be admissible but should never be subject to exclusion. How could The Age
argue otherwise when the bulk of its energies for the last six months has been
devoted to disseminating illegally obtained evidence? Of course, I use the word
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“evidence” in the loosest possible sense. A
The secondary reason, let me remind you, for seeking to exclude illegally
obtained information is that it is so often inherently unreliable. Sometimes it may
be very reliable, as pointed out by some of the previous speakers, but much of it
is inherently unreliable.
The so-called “Age tapes” are a wonderful example of this. As was said,
believe it or not by The Age itself in an Editorial last month,
the difficulty in authenticating the tapes is understandable. The quality is
sometimes poor, and the whereabouts of the originals is unknown. The taping
was probably [probably if you please] done in breach of the law and those who
did it would thus be reluctant to come forward and attempt to substantiate the
contents. (The Age, 27 August 1984)
What is The Age’s suggested solution to this patent unreliability? It is that those
who have committed such clear and serious breaches of the criminal law should be
given an indemnity against prosecution. A course which The Age describes as “not
condoning the illegality and invasions of privacy”. (The Age, 27 August 1984)
Sadly the events of the past six months have set back the Australian debate
about illegally obtained evidence. The general public has, I fear, become quite
accustomed to the notion that “anything goes”. If as Mr Justice Kirby said in his
introductory comments, the community is already intolerant of excluding evidence
how the “Age tapes affair” whether carried on in the press or in Parliament must
have fortified that intolerance. To make matters worse the perpetrators of this
destruction of public standards have attempted to justify themselves with claims
such as they are exposing the Australian Watergate. What utter nonsense that is!
The essential point of Watergate was precisely that those who sought to illegally
obtain and then disseminate or use information were exposed for what they were
— a reckless interest group willing to put fundamental democratic standards at risk.
It will be difficult then to regain credibility for this proposition of fundamental
importance in our society that illegally obtained evidence should readily be subject
to exclusion from proceedings. Let us hope that this seminar and the remarks which
we have so far heard is a substantial step towards beginning to redress the distortions
to societal values which have been created by the squalid business of the “Age
tapes”.
David Brown, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of New South Wales
There are lots of different levels on which we can approach the question of
illegally obtained evidence and much of the discussion of the papers have been at
the rather refined level of ex post facto judicial review or, perhaps more approp-
riately, lack of review, via the exercise of the judicial discretion. I would like to
address the issue of alleged confessional evidence at a rather different level, that of
the regulation (or more appropriately the non-regulation) of the conditions under
which evidentiary accounts in the form of alleged confessions are produced in police
stations. This is a question of immense importance as the empirical studies show.
Nina Stephensonl’s study of the District Court’s files show: (and these are largely
quoted from her findings)
firstly, that 96% of the defendants in her sample were alleged to have made
confessions or damaging statement when interviewed by police.
secondly, “the single most important factor affecting the decision to plead guilty
was thenature of the confessional evidence alleged against the accused”. (page 140)
l. Stephenson, N., “Criminal cases in the NSW District Court: a pilot study”, in Basten et al., The
Criminal Injustice System, A.L.W.G./L.S.B. 1982.
 60
thirdly, it was “somewhat surprising that those charged with more serious offences
, were alleged to have more frequently supplied incriminating statements”. (page 141)
fourthly, “in the overhwelming majority of cases the police witnesses gave evidence
of alleged admission made by the accused”. (p 141).
. fifthly, “in only one trial case in which a voire dire was held . . . did the accused
succeed in having the evidence excluded”. (p 141).
[I think as Greg Woods correctly said cases like Ireland, Driscoll and Cleland2
are very rare when compared with the volume of cases that are going through
the courts daily.]
sixthly, that “few defendants obtained legal advice prior to or during the police
interrogation” and that “in the seven out of ten cases in which the defendant did
obtain legal advice it was alleged that the defendants made damaging admission at
some time prior to the obtaining of legal assistance”. (p 141).
This is the empirical reality. It is backed up by surveys of prisoners, (see M.
Dimelow, “Police Verbals in NSW” in Basten et al. The Criminal Injustice System
A.L.W.G./L.S.B. 1982), it is backed up by the private anecdoctal experience of
lawyers, it is backed up by the Dershowitz rules, it is backed up by the work of
researchs in other jurisdictions such as Baldwin and McConville3 in the UK. With
respect to what Detective Inspector Chad said I think he has chosen the two extreme
examples of terrorism and extortion. These are hardly the run of the mill case that
go on every day through the criminal courts. The empirical background then is a
background of the construction and production of evidentiary accounts in the secret
confines of police stations, in the absence of any independent mechanisms of
scrutiny or accountability. In other words, in structural conditions which make it
inherently impossible to test the reliability of the accounts'emerging independently
of the immediate protagonists and Mr Justice Kirby in his paper talks about the
importance of separating out issues of reliability from those of public interest
concerns.
So I suggest we have to pitch our analysis at the conditions of regulation of the
production of evidentiary accounts. What are some of those conditions of
regulation or, more appropriately, non-regulation?
firstly, the physical monopoly enjoyed by police over the location, space and timing
of interrogation in police stations.
secondly, the issue of secrecy. The lack of any access by third parties such as
lawyers, friends and so on to the interrogation process.
thirdly, the complex social, psychological factors operating in the confessional
context and the inherently coercive character of the interrogation process which in
my view render legal notions of voluntariness very unhelpful or misconceived
categories.
fourthly, the absence of effective review by and accountability to the courts in most
summary and petty session matters.
fifthly, the conduct of such review as is conducted via voire dire hearings in higher
courts following challenges within categories such as voluntariness.
sixthly, the discretionary status of the Judges Rules and Police Instructions.
seventhly, the political power exercised by police both in the narrower and industrial
trade union sense and in the broader ideological terrain of media and cultural
battlefields of “the war against crime”.
I would like to suggest that unless these conditions are addressed we are largely
going around in circles. We might have minor improvements by way of High Court
decisions such as Cleland, Driscoll, and so on. Noticeable is the absence of such
2. Ireland v The Queen (1970) 126 CLR 321; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517; Cleland v The
Queen (1982) 57 ALJR 15, 29.
3. Baldwin, J. and McConville, M., Courts, Prosecution and Conviction, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981.
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decisions from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, with respect to the
Chief Justice, it is difficult to read the decisions like Collins4 case or decisions like
Daryl Burke’55 case as anything other than a determination precisely not to address
these broader structural questions.
In the di Suvero paper on page 48 it is pointed out that exclusionary rules are-
circumvented by “tailored policy testimony designed to make the illegal search
legal”. This is exactly what we see here. We see since the unsigned record of
interview has finally been brought into disrepute, we now have a rise in a sudden
spate of contemporaneous notes and the ever present notebook.
So the point I am making is not an attack on the police as such. We are not
talking about individual “morality” or “perjury” or “lying” on behalf of the
police, we are talking about a question of the structural regulation of the conditions
under which evidentiary accounts are produced and I would suggest that this needs
to be squarely addressed. We need to have the political courage and the legal
courage to address these questions squarely.
John Parnell, Stipendiary Magistrate
There are two matters which I hope I haven’t over simplified, but I think,
generally speaking, they are that the broad concepts of the High Court of Australia
in Running v Cross are acceptable and have been accepted here and will be accepted
elsewhere. The reason, as I see it, is that rigid and inﬂexible parameters are an
anathema in abstract notions of justice. Basically people want to be dealt with by
people, live people, and not by coefficients of correlation.
These matters are important because soon Australia will be asked to consider
a Bill of Rights to supplement the Constitution. Certainly this Bill will involve
placita like the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the American Constitution. The
question that arises is how do the courts maintain control over exclusionary
situations if desired by Parliament?
How they are to do it will pose a drafting difficulty of great magnitude and will
require a lot of advance thought and debate. The first matter I want to pose is what
theLaw Reform Commission has done in this area? I would assume that the Law
Reform Commission has probably considered this other head of the exclusionary
rule and I would be interested in any preliminary thoughts in that regard.
Speaking more specifically, the strong argument against any exclusionary rule
is that the trial is side tracked away from the main issue and often it is a very long
track. For instance, dealing with confessional objections the objection may
simultaneously involve objection to voluntariness and to fairness, and then, of
course, due to the opposing burdens of proof, the trial judge will have two voire
dire trials, one after the other on the same admission. In my view, it is an intolerable
extension of the trial. If the law reform bodies are looking for a pre-trial innovation
and also at the same time looking to give some more meaningful role to the
committal proceedings, I think that all exclusionary issues voluntary, fair or
otherwise could be finalised at the committal stage and the trial confined to issues
of fact, except by extra special leave.
Summary trials of course wouldn’t be affected because voire dire trials can be
incorporated in the main trial. There is some analogy here with the alibi rule which
was introduced in 1974. This would involve some extension of that concept. I think
it is something the law reform bodies could well look at in the interests of curtailing
the length of criminal trials.
The other matter that has been raised at this seminar was some concern that
4. Registrar, Court of Appeal v Collins (1982) l NSWLR 682.
5. N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported 30/11/78.
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exclusions have not occurred in the vast majority of cases when objection is made.
That may well be the case, but I don’t think we can heap the blame for that on to
the court in Kuruma’s case. I think it has to be looked at historically. Our Saxon
antecedents were based upon strict liability inherent in all those concepts of bat and
wer and wite etc., and there has been a slow evolution to the present day. And, it
is still going on. Our system is probably a system of expediency. Indeed, this is
implicit in one of our main maxims, i.e. the ignorantiajuris maxim. That is a maxim
of expediency and it is also implicit in very strong suggestions about some of the
earlier trials in this century. Back in the 1940’s the trial of Lord Haw Haw had
overtones of expediency but was completely accepted by the public. That is a United
Kingdom example and a United States example would be the trial of General
Yamashita. That also had strong overtones of expediency, but again, I think it was
completely accepted by the public.
There is another matter which has arisen on the question of anti-trust trials. I
thought there was an example in the 1960’s, the “gentlemen” conspirators from the
General Electric who were sent to gaol for short terms over anti-trust matters in ‘
Tennessee.
A. Koumakalis, Law Student, University of New South Wales
Two questions to Dr Woods.
First, what do you see to be in reality the predominant form of illegally obtained
evidence presented in the courts today, and
Second, I find it hard to reconcile your point that the answer is partly a re-shaping
of judicial thought. This infers to me a long term answer and as Lord Keynes said
“In the long run we are all dead anyway”, and so as a Public Defender could you
see a more short term answer to the problem.
Dr G.D. Woods
Well, Lord Keynes’ quotation I can answer by a quotation from Dean Swift
who once wrote of one of his characters that he had been “eight years upon a project
for extracting sunbeams out of cucumbers which were to be put into vials hermetically
sealed and let out to warm the air in raw inclement summers”. Now, that is an
exercise in futility. I recognise your impatience. You might see a change in the law
relating to judicial discretion as being an exercise in futility. Those who prefer a
model with a clear cut constitutional basis for exclusion, such as some of our
American friends, take that view. Nonetheless my view is that reshaping of judicial
thought can occur. It is very difficult but it does happen over time. The changes in
attitude in the High Court over the last ten years, for example with respect to
taxation are an example of the way in which judicial thought can be effected by
political movements and even rational argument. Sometimes political movements
and rational argument are not mutually exclusive. As to the first of your questions,
“what is the predominant form of illegally obtained evidence?”, clearly in my view
it is confessional evidence but I don’t think that is the real problem. I think the real
problem is in relation to warrants. 1 think the intrusion into premises and the
intrusion into privacy is just as important as the other more numerically dominant
type of illegally obtained evidence which is the confessional evidence.
Can I add that it seems to me that the use of warrants of search authorised by
Justices of the Peace has long been something of a sham. I regard the best protection
against unlawful intrusion into premises where people are living as being not the fact
that you go before a Justice of the Peace and say certain things to him and get a
piece of paper which authorizes you to do X. It is in the procedures that ought to  
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be followed when the police get to the door. I‘ think that telephone warrants are an
excellent thing. Telephone warrants are not (as some civil libertarians argue) the thin
end of the totalitarian wedge. They are potentially much more protective of people’s
rights than is the present system of obtaining search warrants from Justices of the
Peace. If you associate with a telephone search warrant a requirement that a person
whose house is being intruded upon be given a document by the police which
indicates the date, time, place (etcetera) that, it seems to me, is an effective brake
on police behaviour.
As to what Mr Chad said before, if the police find deficiencies in the laws
affecting their procedure which really hamper them in the proper administration of
their functions they should tell the government that they have a problem. Generally
speaking (I know from experience as a law reformer) the police are not backward
in doing that. They press their claims to increased powers because they see it as their
duty to do so, but if the law goes for a long time and ignored what are their proper
claims then it runs the risk that they will act illegally. Police will breach the rules
because they believe that they have an overriding duty to protect the public, and
their own minor breaches of the law they will regard as irrelevant. Those who
legislate have a duty (1) to ensure that excessive police claims are vigorously rejected
but (2) to accept proper police claims that they do not possess a certain power. There
is always the danger that if there is an area in which the police don’t have a
legitimate technical route to follow in order to do something important, then they
will do it illegally, they will lie about it, they will get a conviction. The greater public
good may be in a sense advantaged but the practice is corruptive of the entire legal
system. There is a duty, as I say, for the law to ensure that that sort of loophole
is clogged up.
L]. Young, Legal Officer, Department of Defence (Army)
You may wonder what my interest is here as the practice of military law is a
fairly esoteric area. However, what I am about to say is more for your information
and may be of assistance in the future. Parliament has introduced a Defence Force
(Discipline) Act. That is an Act which will provide for discipline for the three
services, presently we each have a separate disciplinary Act. It is to be introduced
in March of next year. It was intended that the Criminal Investigation Bill when it
became law would be referred to in the Defence Force (Discipline) Act. In other
words, the Criminal Investigation Act would be adhered to and followed by the
Services. As it is now doubtful when that Bill, the Criminal Investigation Bill, will
become law the Defence Force (Discipline) Act has actually incorporated the
provisions of the Criminal Investigation Bill. In a sense the Services will become a
trial horse, as I see it, for the Criminal Investigation Bill.
Some of the provisions of what will be the Defence Force (Discipline) Act it
seems to me it will make it very difficult for police to get confessions, rightly or
wrongly. Brieﬂy, when a serviceman is taken into custody he is to be given a written
warning, the normal warning, of course, is presently verbal. He is also to be given
a list of service legal officers whom he can call on. It seems to me that once a person
is in custody, particularly a guilty perosn, and he is given a warning in writing and
can sit there calmly and read it, and he is also told the name of a legal officer to
call on, he will obviously take advantage of these circumstances. That is his right,
as Parliament has seen fit to incorporate these provisions. I simply mention those
matters because you may not have been aware that the Criminal Investigation Bill
will be incorporated in the Defence Force (Discipline) Act and it will be interesting
to see how it works in practice.
 F______,,,, E,WWW, . ,
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H. di Suvero
If I may, without appearing to be the brash American, I would like to ask the
members of the panel what they think of the idea of having a reasonable seizure and
search provision in an Australian Bill of Rights, and secondly, if they are in favour
of it whether it should also have exclusionary rule?
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
This brings us back to what Mr Parnell asked earlier, namely whether the
Australian Law Reform Commission has had anything to do with the present move
towards a Bill of Rights on which Senator Evans is working. The short answer to
that is, “no”. We have not been involved as a Commission, though I have been sent
a copy of the Bill for the purpose of offering any personal comments. As a conse-
quence a few personal comments haVe been offered but not at any great length
because we just have not had the time having other statutory functions to perform.
So far as the adopting wholesale the American jurisprudence and its formula-
tion, in the famous language of Maddison of 1790, I am afraid I would not favour
that in our country. If we have a Bill of Rights, we have to develop a home grown
Bill of Rights which is the result of a process akin to that which has occurred in
Canada. I was in Canada, I hasten to add at the expense of the Canadians, about
two weeks ago for the centenary of the British Columbia Law Society. There was
general gloom and pessimism about the future of the legal profession particularly
because they face many of the same debates concerning accident compensation,
divorce, litigation and conveyancing as we face in this country. Not only did we
form our Law Societies about the same time in the 18805 but we now face the same
problems, 100 years on.
But there was general confidence that a growth industry would exist in the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms. That Charter, of course, arOSe ten years
after an earlier endeavour to do what Senator Evans is now seeking to do in
Australia namely, develop a statutory Bill of Rights. This is the track we are likely
to go down in Australia if we ever do move to a Constitutional Bill of Rights,
especially bearing in mind our supreme conservatism in matters constitutional in this
country. The Canadians were forced to do it, in a sense, in order to repatriate their
constitution. They had an occasion to do it. We do not have any such great occasion
that will cause us fundamentally to review our Constitution, unless it be the Bi-
Centenary. I hope we do something more than have four-masted ships coming out
here. If we do, I hope we do not just borrow language, however famous and cryptic
and well worked over, of a different time and a different jurisprudence and a
different country. I hope that we do our own job. I suspect that we will do so in
rather lengthier language, so that we spell out in greater detail for the judges, in
accordance with our views of the Rule of Law, so that the People or the Parliament
lay down the principles. If we adhere to brief language we will be leaving it to judges
to define our rights, with great uncertainty obtaining for many years to come. If
Senator Evans is returned to his office (although it must be remarked that he does
not have unanimous support within the Government on the question of the Bill of
Rights) I believe that it is likely that the Government will go ahead with a Bill of
Rights. It will be a statutory Bill of Rights. It will obtain for several years. And then
we will ask ourselves whether we want a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. You ask
in what terms that Charter would be expressed. The terms will not be the terms of
the American Constitution but rather elaborate provisions made in Australia so that
judges are told in greater clarity what the People and the Parliament want and are
not left, like a ship, to sail and discover what these vague expressions of broad
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human rights mean. That is, at least, my conception of the Rule of Law. I believe
it is the way we will go in Australia.
Detective Sergeant Nelson Chad
In answer to your question and in relation to Mr Brown, police officers are
purely the machinery of the law as we all realise. Make no mistake we would
welcome a Criminal Investigation Bill. We would welcome tape recorded evidence.
It would take a lot off our backs when we have to go to court and stand up and
be criticised and ridiculed by various advocates. We would welcome that
opportunity. The only problem is, of course, politicians obviously look at the cost
factor. That should not be the factor that determines the issue, it should be by rights
of the people. We unashamedly say bring in the tape recordings by all means.
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
It seems to me, adopting my legal realist hat, that we are not going to get a Bill
of Rights because to have a Bill of Rights requires a state of political flux which does
not exist in Australia. We will not have a Bill of Rights while Senator Harradine has
the balance of power in the Senate. We will not have a Bill of Rights during the
course of the next Federal Parliament for the reason that there will not be consensus,
and there is no overriding national passion for a statement of rights in the form of
a Charter of Rights. The great Charters such as the Magna Carta, the American Bill
of Rights and so on have all arisen out of political contexts of enormous change,
enormous unity or purpose usually directed at an identified enemy. Such conditions
do not exist in Australia. I think we will continue to see piecemeal legal change,
whether it be thought to be progressive or regressive (and it will probably be a bit
of both) but I think we will simply not have a Bill of Rights.
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
If I could just add a footnote to this, it is interesting to note that the line up
of the political parties is absolutely different in the United Kingdom to the line up
in this country. In the UK. it is the conservative political party which favours a Bill
of Rights. Lord Hailsham is the strongest advocate and there are other Law Lords
and others who have come out in favour of it. The Labour party when in govern-
ment in the United Kingdom, and since in Opposition, has expressed itself against.
They say that it is better to leave power in the Parliament rather than hand power
over to judges, who generally will be unrepresentative and unsympathetic to the view
of the working people, and that it is better to have rules developed in Parliament
rather than in the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.
In Australia, the line up has been absolutely different. The recent statement on
law and justice of the Liberal Party for the forthcoming Federal election makes it
plain. The Liberal Party in this country continues its strong opposition to a Bill of
Rights, contending that it can lead to vagueness and to a shift of power to the
judiciary. It is the Labor Party, or at least Senator Evans and a number of his
colleagues in the Labor Party, who assert that it is better to get a statement of the
consensus on the basic principles of our society and get these put above party politics
so that we can get on with the other debates but leave to the judiciary the role of
protecting basic articulated rules of fundamental rights and freedoms.
In Canada there is, I think it is fair to report, general satisfaction with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Not just on a selfish basis within the legal
profession but a feeling that the Common Law has failed. The instruments of the
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Common Law failed to move with the pace within a rapidly changing society with
large numbers of immigrants and so on, and that therefore it was important to find
a statement of fundamental rights and freedoms and to put them into the
Constitution. They seem in Canada to be rather satisfied with the Charter and they
feel that it is going to turn lawyers to do things which are worthy of lawyers, namely
exploring quasi-philosophical questions about the future design of society. This, it
is claimed, is something worthy of the intellect of the best lawyers and judges of the
country. It is right to report to you that there is great excitement in Canada. There
is a concern not to just go down the American track but to develop their own - l
fundamental rights and freedoms. They have got it now. I suspect Dr Woods is 1
probably right in terms of Realpolitik in Australia. But we should all watch closely ‘
the situation in Canada as it develops in the next few years.
A]. Bellanto, Crown Prosecutor
I have a question to Dr Greg Woods.
You make the point in your paper that judges are somewhat reluctant to
exclude evidence bearing in mind they have the discretion. The New South Wales
Law Reform Commission in their paper in 1979, referring to the decision in Ireland
stated the rule quite brieﬂy, and it appears it had not become clear to the legal
profession generally that the court intended to change the law as distinct from
merely again following Kuruma. Now, of course, Banning v Cross was decided in
1978, and the point I would like to make, and the question I ask is do you think
it is perhaps a little premature to say that the judges are reluctant to exclude
evidence, bearing in mind that it is relatively recently in judicial terms that the law
in Australia has been changed away from Kuruma to the discretion that we have
now?
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
Yes, I think there is some substance in that. I am simply hoping to assist that
process of change by making the comments I have. I think you are right. I think
it takes a while for these things to become clear. The court has not said either in
Ireland or in Banning v Cross “We are setting out to change the law”, because (I
suppose) for the reason that they traditionally are reluctant to do so. I think there
is becoming a greater awareness of judicial discretion and entitlement to reject
evidence and I hope that that process does speed up.
A.J. Bellanto
If that is the case, then doesn’t it appear that the lines have been fairly clearly
drawn now? The High Court has laid down that Bunning v Cross is the law. There
is this judicial discretion and judges are perfectly equipped and quite capable of
making the decision on what is properly admissible bearing in mind the criteria laid
out in Bunning v Cross and Other criteria that has been referred to in many other
decisions, particularly South Australian cases. The criteria is there, it is simply for
the courts to decide what is properly admissible and what should be rejected in the
public interest.
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
Can I say that the answer might lie in the approach on page 21 of the paper
His Honour Mr Justice Kirby presented. He talks about appellate review and says
 67
that the point of Bunning v Cross was that a judicial discretion was given. He says:
An issue that needs to be considered is whether the present rule is appropriate
where a discretion involves consideration of matters of public interest, upon
which the general guidance of appeal courts may be useful in diminishing
idiosyncrasy and1h identifying and ranking competing aspects of the complex
public policies involved.
I would suggest that it is not simply the judges at first instance who ought to
be aware of this. Judges on Appeal are reluctant to hamper judicial discretionjat
first instance because they do not want to be overwhelmed by massive numbers of
cases coming before them in the Appeal Courts. They don’t want to stimulate too
much litigation. They want to leave some things to the commonsense of the judges,
the discretion of the judges. We all know that the Appeal Courts can maintain that
rule and yet a bit of “guided democracy” occurs. If the Appeal Courts give a few
decisions about a certain matter being beyond discretion or perhaps that a judge
ought to have taken a certain view, that has the effect of guiding the discretion of
the judges in the lower courts. I think that is what should happen.
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
Whilst we are interrogating DrWoods, which is always good fun, I wonder if
I could ask him to give his response to Mr Chad’s case of the hostage and terrorists?
Conceding, as Mr Brown says, that it is an extreme case it nonetheless poses the issue
in terms of whether we accept an absolutist rule in respect of telecommunication
privacy. Ought there to be an exception for certain cases having regard to the
seriousness of them which goes beyond security and beyond the drug cases which
are the two cases presently provided for? Ought the very serious criminal casetto be
provided for in the legislation? Or does Dr Woods take an absolute view that
remaining vestiges of telecommunication privacy are so important that we must
preserve them at all costs, even in cases of hostages, or turn a blind eye as is
apparently being suggested to be the solution to Mr Chad’s problem?
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
As I understand it, and I don’t want to be held to this, but this is my reading
of the Act, section 7(6)(c) allows a police officer to give evidence in effect for any
offence against the law of the Commonwealth, or of a State or Territory, punishable
by imprisonment for life or for a period or a maximum period of not less than three
years, using information obtained by telephone intercept. I think the point that
Nelson Chad was making was that the situation appears to be that the police officer
commits an offence in the first place in the intercept but the evidence is nonetheless
admissible. I would want to look at it more carefully, but I think that is the position,
which means that the evidence is admitted. The hostage situation clearly involves an
offence against a State punishable by imprisonment for more than three years and
that evidence in my view would probably be admissible, but if the point he is making
is if the original behaviour is unlawful it shouldn’t be. I think that may be a good
point.
As to the hostage situation, where the evidence is obtained by a surveillance
device of some kind, an electronic listening device, that is not covered at the present
time but it is covered under the new Listening Devices Act 1984, which is not .yet
proclaimed, because it relates to an imminent threat of serious violence to persons
or substantial damage to property, so that the point that Detective Sergeant Chad
was raising has been addressed by those who had the task of formulating this
legislation.
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As to the general principle, my position is that if there is no legality for the
telephone intercept or the surveillance intercept, there should be a flat prohibition
on the use in court proceedings of that material. But I think it is important, as I
say, that we make exception for proper police activity and a hostage situation clearly
is, on any view, a situation where it is necessary to tape record what is being said
by the person who holds a person captive. It has to be done and it ought to be lawful
for the police officer to do it, and it ought to be admissible in evidence.
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
Perhaps I should say that in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 1983
Report on Privacy we said that, recognising the problem that presently exists, there
ought to be an exception in the case of serious offences. We defined these as
offences carrying punishment of more than seven years. We said that against a
background of very strict preconditions relating to judicial warrants and also
reporting to Parliament the numbers of warrants being exercised during the year.
This last mentioned precaution happens in Canada and the United States but not,
I think, in Australia, at least not under statute. I was interested to see a few weeks
ago that our recommendation was repeated by Mr Frank Vincent, Q.C., in his
report on Telecom and the so-called “scrap machine” which has been urged for use
by Telecom. This is the machine which monitors the numbers called. It keeps the
list of the numbers that are telephoned. Mr Vincent recommended that it should be
available only on the same criteria as the Law Reform Commission had suggested
in the Privacy Report. The Privacy Report, like the Criminal Investigation Report,
is in the hands of an interdepartmental committee in Canberra. This is not quite as
bad as being in the hands of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. But is
not far behind.
Charles Goldberg, Solicitor
I have been interested in the attitude that has been displayed in relation to the
confessional material because that is the area that does tend to come into my
province more often. I am somewhat surprised at Detective Sergeant Chad’s
assertion that he would welcome the advent of some sort of device to be consistent
with or to reassure us in relation to confessions being taken. I say this because I have
some doubts as to the custom adopted by numerous police officers of neglecting the
use of the official police notebook. What I would like Detective Sergeant Chad to
tell me is, is it the custom in the force today to take those instructions, which every
officer as I understand it should pay attention to, merely as guidelines rather than
as a mandatory course of conduct that should be pursued in relation to interviewing
suspects? I say this because it is obvious that a police officer must interview a suspect
at the earliest possible time after the commission of an alleged offence, but would
it not be possible at the conclusion of an interview, rather than using the services
of a senior police officer or the duty officer at the CIB, for some arrangement to
be brought about whereby an independent person such as a Justice of the Peace
might be available to speak to the individual who has just completed the interroga-
tion or record of interview with a police officer? If that course was adopted then
it should put an end to the suggestion that is often put before defence counsel that
the person was too frightened to bring to the attention of the police officer matters
that had occurred during the course of the interview.
I would also like this meeting to give some thought to the comments that have
been made in relation to the exclusion of evidence by the trial judge. I think Mr
Parnell suggested that this course might well be completed in the pre-trial
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manoeuvres before the magistrate at committal proceedings. All that I can suggest
to Mr Parnell is that I frequently raised matters on a voire dire before our
magistrates, and it is a very rare occasion that evidence is excluded because the
general tendency is for the magistrate to wait until he hears it" all and to make a
decision at the completion — one doesn’t get any joy out of taking that course of
action before learned magistrates. Unfortunately, the same situation seems to
prevail when one comes up before the trial judge'because I think it was one of the
members of the panel who suggested that the trial judge is usually in a better
position to decide how a discretion should be exercised. Of course, we are
confronted again by the personal idiosyncrasies of the individual trial judges but one
again finds the same situation. Which level is the trial judge to look at in relation
to the evidence? I am dealing wholely and solely in the area of confessional material
at this point because one is so accustomed to hearing Crown witnesses coming
forward to what might only be described as an orchestration (quite recently a certain
judge made remarks about that).
I appreciate, and no doubt everybody else at this Seminar does, that it is
difficult to go and get your statements together, but it is fairly clear that statements
are being prepared in conjunction, and all that is being presented at trial level are
the different witnesses indicating just how well their memories are subject to testing
—- putting out a statement that is completely identical even as to terminology. One
can only say that trial judges are not adopting that concept, that in my respectful
view to you, Sir, that was put down in the Bunning v Cross level.
Finally to conclude my remarks-I cannot quite understand, Mr Justice Kirby,
your fear that the appellate courts are going to be swamped with innumerable
appeals because there is no doubt in my mind that the appellate court is going to
take a certain stand for a series of matters to come before those worthy gentlemen.
Surely, the appellate court is there at all times for the purpose of giving a convicted
person some recourse and it is not proper, in my respectful suggestion to you, Sir,
to say that there is going to be a danger of a large number of appeals that will cause
some form of inconvenience to the appellate courts.
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
I was simply explaining in my paper the reluctance of Appeal Courts to
intervene in discretionary rulings by trial judges. I think the thrust of what I said,
particularly in the last paragraph, is that perhaps we will have to reconsider this
approach in this particular case. I say that with diffidence and with some anxiety
because of the post that I am about to assume. The thrust of my paper is quite the
contrary to the way in which you have read it. It is that the inclination of Appeal
Courts not to interfere in the exercise of trial discretions have been grounded on
legitimate public policy. But those inclinations may need to be reconsidered in this .
case because of the highly complex questions of public policy that are involved. At
least the Appeal Court may need to intervene to lay down criteria for the exercise
of the discretion and to scrutinize the exercise of this discretion more closely. I was
merely stating the explanation given for the appellate diffidence which, normally
speaking, I would agree with but which may need reconsideration in this particular
case.
Detective Sergeant Chad
In answer to Mr Goldberg’s question. Firstly, the Police Rules and Instructions
are guidelines to the police officers. Speaking from practical experience if you have
a person whom you suspect for an offence you can interview him in a number of
 70
forms: records of interview signed or unsigned, notebooks etc. It depends on the
situation — I am speaking from a practical point of view. Sometimes if you start
to talk to a person and make notes the person often stops talking, then notes are
usually made at the end of that conversation and they are referred to in evidence.
In relation to your senior officer witnessing interviews. It should be' clear that
the senior officer should be a person who is not involved with the investigation at
any time, and whilst you infer that say two police officers might get their heads
together and do things, you rely on the senior officer. He has to be a senior sergeant
or an inspector. These are people who have some credibility or they wouldn’t get
that far in the police force, but apart from that you have got to have a criteria for
your offence. That is the weakness of your argument. To get a JP or someone to
come along to every police station at any hour of the day or night to be a witness
to any offence that was going to be contested at any stage is an impractibility in
relation to the Child Welfare Act. We are getting a lot of criticism from people in
relation to young persons arrested under the Crimes Act because they can’t be
interviewed at various times and the facts put forward are only the facts of the
arrest. Cases have been thrown out because they have not been interviewed. This
is because we can’t get the parents or someone suitable who fits within the criteria
or the statute to come in the early hours of the morning. So somewhere along the
line we have to make a stand — that someone has to be a third person, an
independent person or quasi-independent such as a senior officer. At least, they can
give some credence to the story and support the two investigating officers. I believe
that it would be better if we could get someone independent but it is very hard at
Darlinghurst at 3 o’clock in the morning to get someone to come to a police station
and witness a statement or record of interview. The other factor is that it is very
hard, and particularly under the Child Welfare Act, they don’t want to come to
court.
The answer to this problem is what has been mooted in the Investigation Bill.
If tape recordings are done in a sterile state and done properly, that is the best
answer. You have everything there — the inflection of the voice rather than the
written word and can understand the mode of the interview and the way in which
the person answers the questions. You are only reading the written word when it
comes to court. You rely on the police officer to give his emphasis of the situation
which may or may not be true, and therefore a tape recording in a sterile state gives
the actual emphasis on how the interview was conducted. The judge and jury can
then form their own opinion as to the voluntariness or otherwise of the situation.
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
The answer for Mr Goldberg to this dilemma is once again to be found in
Sherlock Holmes, where in the Case of the Retired Colourman Holmes is in a case
when another private detective becomes involved. Holmes says “He has several
good cases to his credit has he not, lnspector?”, “He has certainly interfered several
times”, the Inspector answered with reserve. “His methods are irregular no doubt
like my own. The irregulars are useful sometimes, you know. You, for example,
with your compulsory warning about whatever he said being used against him could
have never had bluffed this rascal into what is virtually a confession.” “Perhaps
not, but we get there all the same, Mr Holmes.”
We may need a few more Sherlock Holmes types around the place to avoid this
problem, but in the absence of a revival of this mode of dealing with the criminal
problem, perhaps the answer is as the Criminal Investigation Bill says. Detective
Sergeant Chad says the use of tape recorded interrogations is acceptable to the police
and this is currently being urged within the government of New South Wales. Such
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a reform would save much court time, and it would allow the conviction of a lot
of guilty people. Hopefully it would allow a lot of innocent people to be left alone
and one hopes that. it is a step that might be taken soon.
N.A. Harrison, Deputy Solicitor for Public Prosecutions in New South Wales
I would like to make four small comments:
The suggestion from Mr Goldberg that an independent Justice of the Peace
might be used as a means of regularizing the adoption of records of interview raises
the same problem that has arisen in the past in relation to the same Justice of the
Peace issuing search warrants where the complaint is that the police have their local
ambulance driver or tame delicatessen man available at all hours of the day or night
to issue search warrants. You are going to have exactly the same situation in relation
to Justices of the Peace being present when records of interview are being adopted.
I suggest that as an immediate compromise, if we are going to worry about the cost
of having the whole record of interview tape recorded, the Victorian practice of
having the adoption part of the interview taped, i. 6. whether the interview has taken
place orally or by tape recording or typewriter or in a notebook the actual part where
the record is read over to the accused person or the offender by a senior officer and
that is then tape recorded. No objection can then be taken to the adoption of the
document itself or the record, however it is made.
One of the other speakers referred to police officers putting together their heads
in relation to their statements, so that there was absolutely no variation and they
had learnt them parrot fashion, and the end result was most of the case consisted
of trying to break small chinks1n the armour. The other problem of course if the
police officers prepare their statements independently and there is a variation then
they are greatly criticised by the defence. If the statements tally they can’t win, if
the statements don’t tally they can’t win.
There was an earlier suggestion from one of our American friends that he was
hoping for a more liberal Supreme Court in the United States which might reverse
the current trend. Another speaker from the University of New South Wales asked
Dr Woods how long it would take for judges to start to exercise their discretion.
Heaven forbid that I should suggest to Dr Woods that his statement in his paper
that judges don’t exercisetheir discretion is hearsay, I don’ t know how often Dr
Woods does get into court at present, but it seems to me of recent months there15
a distinct trend in judges excluding material on the grounds of it being illegally
obtained. That trend may be because the judges are being appointed by less
conservative governments and therefore less conservative judges are being
appointed.
One of the problems I feel for'judges sitting on cases where voire dire exercises
are undertaken15 this. I don’ t know whether this ever appeared1n Sherlock Holmes,
but the standard alibi1s “I wasn’t there but if I was there I didn’t do it”. The usual
voire dire defence at the moment in relation to a contested record of interview is “I
didn’t say it. It was a ‘verbal’, but if I did say it it was induced from me and should
be excluded because it was illegally obtained”. If you have a two barrelled voire dire
in that situation it is very hard for a trial judge to look rationally at the second leg
and exercise his discretion I do not want to be seen to be disrespectful and mean
that the defence should tailor their voire dires simply to allege illegally obtained
confessions rather than “verbals” just to allow the judges to exercise their discretion
more often than they do nowadays.
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Dr Marc M. Gumbert, Barrister-at-Law
In relation to the question of allegedly fabricated confessions —— “verbals” as
they are known colloquially — that is an area in my view as a Crown Prosecutor,
which is perhaps more in need of reform, both procedurally and substantively, than
any other area of criminal justice administration. However, I would suggest that
that question falls entirely outside the scope of the present seminar. This is so
because the problem in relation to allegedly fabricated evidence is not whether such
evidence was illegally obtained but whether it was obtained at all.
The whole question of verbal confessions is in no sense less important than the
question we are discussing at this seminar but it ought not to be mixed up with it.
I would certainly like to see a similar symposium of the present sort being arranged
to discuss the complicated and crucial issues involved in relation to the area of verbal
confessions.
However, as several other speakers have given their views on the subject of
verbal confessions, let me brieﬂy state that I would like to see particularly rigid
provisions as to the taking of confessions . . . perhaps along the lines of sound or
video recording or indeed, a procedure somewhat similar to that sketched by a
previous speaker when discussing the recently passed Defence Force (Discipline)
Act. After all, if you are going to give a suspect a caution, let it be a real caution
and, if he avails himself of that caution, if that be the law, so be it.
Let me now add what I would conceive as constituting something of the central
problem area which should be the concern of this particularly important seminar.
Society is in a continuous and permanent state of stress. We live in the present but
we take our rules from the past. Our traditions help guide us in the present and,
eventually, the future. In relation to that state of stress at any present moment, there
is always the immediate temptation to take up an ad hoc solution of expedience ——
such as reliance upon illegally obtained evidence — to deal with any trouble case.
Our previously created rules and traditions offer some inhibition against the taking
up of unprincipled expedient techniques. And yet, of course, the temptation to
expediency is always there. I suggest we corrupt ourselves if we permit such
immediate pressure to prevail. Society can better live with isolated cases of
successful evaders of particular crimes than with the breach of its own previously
established rules and traditions.
It is perhaps only when the pressure has passed and we look backwards in time
that we can really appreciate the price we pay in liberty and integrity by sacrificing
principle to immediate pressure. Other speakers have mentioned the McCarthy era.
Our Australian equivalent may well have been the Petrov years. Today, most people
look back to those years with repulsion. That is not even a long sweep of history
— only some 30 years. It may not take long to appreciate societal abuses occasioned
by an immediate or perceived pressure to breach established traditions but,
unfortunately, it is always easier to appreciate this in retrospect when the damage
has been done. '
The question should then be, I submit, not whether or not illegally obtained
evidence should be admitted — it should not — but rather, to sketch out the ground
rules — perhaps through the Parliament — as to what will or will not constitute the
legal means of obtaining it. No agony of some subsequent moment should then be
permitted to breach those previously articulated rules. No state functionary or other
' person should be encouraged or rewarded for breaching those tules. And while no
doubt, in result, some miscreants will go free, let that be the price society pays. The
alternative demands a far higher price.
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Bron McKi/lop, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney.
I would like to refer to two matters that, I think, are related to illegally obtained
evidence. Firstly, the matter of entrapment. Now this is dealt with somewhat
cryptically perhaps for this present audience in Mr Ransom’s paper and it does
appear that in the United States entrapment is a defence to a criminal charge. It does
not appear to be based upon the Constitution of the United States but to be a
Common Law defence. Unfortunately there seems to have never been any instance
of that being accepted as a defence either in Australia or, I understand, the United
Kingdom. Further, entrapment as a defence has been rejected by the English Law
Commission. There are occasional cases of exclusion of evidence obtained in
circumstances of entrapment but there does not appear to be any’such defence. In
regard to inquiries such as the present Ananda Marga inquiry here and the sort of
situation that arose in the recent De Lorean case in the United States it does seem
that there is scope for further consideration of that as a defence and, possibly, as
a Common Law defence.
The second matter is in relation to a judgement of the New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal on the 15th March 1984 in the case of The Queen v Dugan in
which the Chief Justice presided and that, you may recall, was a case of an appeal
against a conviction for attempted robbery of a service station by one Darcy Dugan
and one of the grounds of appeal was the misreception of evidence in the exercise
of the trial judge’s discretion and that was based on the “evidentiary aspect” of
Bunning v Cross. The Chief Justice in Dugan’s case referred to another aspect of
Bunning v Cross and, if I could paraphrase, that was the possibility from the
judgments in Bunning v Cross of a verdict by direction by the trial judge on the basis
that the whole Crown case is tainted by conducted and subterfuge in the processes
of criminal investigation that are unfair or unlawful in the sense of bearing so gross
a character so as to offend against concepts of democratic decency. Now that seems‘
to be a more basic notion of due process in relation to criminal investigation and
something that seems to invoke fundamental Common Law doctrine and which
hopefully could be more widely embraced by the courts.
Ken HorIer, Barrister-at-Law
I want to suggest that the argument about the reception of so called free
confessions is always going to be present in the criminal law, and that is why as a
neo-Luddite, I want to suggest that technology alone is not going to be the answer
to that problem unless the Parliament, with or without the appellate courts, is going
to say that only what appears on the tape, other pre-conditions having been
satisfied, is going to be received in evidence. Having said that, I would like to try
to gather together two strains of comments that have been made in the last few
minutes. .
. Most of you here will know that under the Child Welfare Act certain statutory
protections are given to young people who are under a disability in respect of .
making statements which will be adverse to their interests (s.8l(C)) so that a
confession cannot be received against a young person unless one of a listed group
of people are present in order to act as a kind of “statutory umpire”. That
protection only exists in respect of the young person when a so-called “confessional
record of interview” is conducted in a police station. What in fact happens (in spite
of some very strong judgments by, amongst others, Mr Justice Yeldham and Mr
Justice Miles) in the case of young aborigines in such a disadvantaged position is
that the alleged verbals occur, so the defence would argue, before that person under
arrest is taken to the police station. The court will either in the exercise of its
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discretion or availing itself of the statute, say in the Child Welfare Act, reject what
might have been said by the young person at the police station if the parent,
guardian, lawyer, friend, child welfare officer or similar person is not there. If that
young person has been “verballed” or made some admission in a police car on the
way to the police station (that not being a police station, although I have with some
sophistry argued a police vehicle might be a police station on the move) that may
be received in evidence.
Let me move to the other area. It is thought that modern technology and tape
recording will prevent there being any real argument at the trial as to whether or not
something was said and in the circumstances in which it was said. Those who believe
that that is the answer to the continuing argument about what can be admitted in
argument against an accused have to be satisfied. I think Parliament would have to
lay down provisions that only what was said on that tape recording as opposed to
something that was not on the tape of the order “Oh well Sergeant I would like to
make a clean breast of it” was not itself receivable in evidence. Unless you do that
the argument will never go away, because there will be very occasionally some
dishonest and rather eager policeman who faced with a denial or an availing of the
right to silence or an exculpating event, nevertheless will want to say in the analogy
of the young aborigine in the car on the way to Brewarrina Police Station “Oh, but
he made this admission outside of those circumstances”. So, don’t believe that
technology is going to solve it unless you address the whole of the situation in which
the confessional material can be received.
Hon. Justice M.D. Kirby
Though it was a bit slow to start, this has been a useful seminar. Certainly, as
some of the comments illustrated, it is addressing a very lively topic and one which
is going to be with us for some time. It is a topic which is central to our freedoms
and therefore one which is worthy of our time tonight.
I address myself to the issue of Mr Chad’s intervention which worried me,
namely the case of hostages and terrorism. True it is, as Mr Brown points out, that
it is an extreme case. But one tests reactions to these problems by extreme cases. I
mentioned to you what the Law Reform Commission had done in its Report on
Privacy, A.L.R.C. 22, where we adopted a principle of seven years imprisonment
as the criterion for legalising intercepts of the telephone under strict conditions. This
approach would, if adopted, meet the problems raised by Mr Chad.
Dr Woods’ statement that Leon, the recent US Supreme Court decision, was
following the same line as the Law Reform Commission was flattering but not
entirely accurate. We do send our Reports to the Supreme Court of the United States
but I can’t imagine law clerks would have drawn it to the notice of their Honours.
In fact you will have gathered elliptically (as Professor Harding says I must now
speak) that in my paper I am a little critical of the Leon test. It talks of “bona
fides”, admittedly bona fides on reasonable grounds. But that is a very difficult test
to operate in practice. To get into the minds and the bona fides, however reasonably
held of police officers or other public officers is, I think, a very unsatisfactory test.
The U.S. Supreme Court is no doubt stumbling along the way which will ultimately
lead it to the shining light of the Law Reform Commission’s Report. Perhaps I
should send another copy of it to Washington. I hope I can send a copy of the
Australian Criminal Investigation Act to the U.S. Supreme Court Library in due
course.
Mr Ransom’s intervention about “political crimes” would I think have been .
more useful if he helped us by defining by what he had in mind as “political
crimes”. Some people’s notion of what is a “political crime” may be different to
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another person’s. I think that the expression would have been helpfully defined. But
it was not.
Mr di Suvero’s intervention was very interesting because he illustrated a great
change in the US from a test expressed in terms of the competition between the
public interest in admission and the public’.9 interest in excluding the evidence (the
macro aggregate of community evidence in excluding evidence) towards what he
suggests is now the Leon test — namely the competition between the public interest
in admission and the private interest in exclusion. In the Law Reform Commission
between ALRC 2, Criminal Investigation, and ALRC 22, Privacy, we went in
exactly the opposition way. In ALRC 2 we said it was a competition between the
public interest in admission and the private interest of the individual (so that it
“does not unduly affect the rights of the individual”). Whereas by the time we got
to our Privacy Report six years later we had seen the light that Hank di Suvero
suggested tonight. We said that what is truly at stake is a competition among
competing public interests. On the one hand the public’s interest in the admission
of reliable probative evidence and on the other hand the public’s interest in
excluding evidence unlawfully obtained for the reasons that I have set out in the
paper.
Mr Parnell’s statement about committals evidenced a different conception of
the committal procedure to that at least which I hold. I do not see the committal
as a sort of pre-trial procedure as such but an executive enquiry. I cannot see it as
appropriate to forfeit the role of the presiding judge in the criminal trial so that he
surrenders his functions in respect of the admission of evidence to somebody who
has conducted a committal beforehand. At least I could not see that happening
without very considerable strengthening of the role of the committal and careful
consideration of such a fundamental change of its functions.
Mr Young’s statement about the Defence Force (Discipline) Act was interesting
andcame as news to me. I am the last to hear about the implementation of reports '
of the Law Reform Commission. But it is reassuring to know that Senator Evans’
general statements that he intends to introduce laws based on the Criminal
Investigation Report has been evidenced in this very significant way. That is where
Ilost Mr Young. Because when he started talking about the dangers of actually
putting a warning in writing and of giving people true access to lawyers by giving
them a list of available practitioners it seemed to me that this was falling into one
of the essential problems of our legal system. This is that it is all very well to have
rights so long as you are sure that those rights will almost certainly not be exercised.
Of course, this is the point that the evidence and very detailed research in Britain
of Baldwin and McConville mentioned in my paper illustrates. Our criminal justice
system simply could not work if it were not for the extremely high proportion of
pleas of guilty. It may be that we have to adjust the accused’s rights. Perhaps we
should reconsider the warning and the right to the lawyer. But surely, so long as
these rights or privileges are recognised by our law we ought, as Dr Gumbert said,
take them seriously. Rights matter most when a person is being accused of a serious
criminal offence. By the way, as a footnote, it should perhaps be emphasised that
psychological evidence suggests that under the stress of interrogation people are so
ﬂustered that you can give them a confetti of paper warnings and oral cautions and
they will not really read them or listen to them carefully. Sitting down “calmly”,
as Mr Young said, is not the problem. The problem is getting into the mind of the
accused in a legitimate and viable way information fundamental to our accusatorial
criminal justice system. I do not think we need worry too much that that is going
to undermine the process of interrogation.
Mr Goldberg’s statement about taking accused persons before independent
people reminded me what the British did in India. Because of the great problem in
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India of perjured evidence the British introduced the obligation to take the accused
before magistrates to give evidence. We thought of that in the Law Reform
Commission. But because of certain constitutional problems we did not feel that
under Federal Statute we could impose such a duty on State magistrates. It is a
solution which may be needed in the future to supplement sound recording, which
I was delight to hear Mr Chad support. Good policemen will support sound and
video recording of admissions and confessions because although Mr Horler points
out it is not a perfect prevention it will, I believe, become a great weapon in the
armoury of the Crown. It will lay at rest many of the battles which presently cause
great problems for the relationship between the police and society.
Finally, Mr Harrison mentioned the Victorian compromise, namely reading
over just the adoption of the confession. I do not think that is good enough. We
have already incurred, by definition, the capital costs. The capital costs are the
major thing: setting up the booths, or providing the special sound recorders, getting
the tapes and so on. The marginal cost of a longer tape is not going to be a major
factor. As well as that, by the time you get to the read back there is at least the
slightest risk that a person might be psychologically browbeaten. It may be much
more helpful to the courts administering the criminal law to know what went before.
In conclusion, this has been a useful seminar. There are issues which certainly
command the attention of citizens. Let us hope that they will also have the attention
of our politicians.
Detective Sergeant Nelson Chad
As pointed out by several speakers it would appear that the greatest volume of
illegally obtained evidence is in the confessional field. Believe it or not, people do
confess to crimes. There seems to be a general apathy amongst people to believe that
people do confess, but put yourself in a situation where you are aroused out of bed
at 5 o’clock in the morning by a team of para-military style people and taken to a
police station. You see someone down the other end of the hall and you may have
been involved with him in the incident. The first thing you want to do is say “I’ll
tell you my part”, and to play yourself down and implicate the other fellow. So
confessions do occur.
I know as long as we have confessional evidence in our society that it will always
be contested because what is said in the heat of the moment is always contested
afterwards, obvsiously on the advice of counsel. This is probably the greatest
weapon in the law enforcement agency as far as the jury is concerned. Juries love
to hear confessions. Let’s face it. They like to be Perry Mason, too, but with
scientific evidence and a number of the recent cases rather sceptical about it, they
do like to hear the confessional statement made by the person concerned. The only
way to get around this of course is to have a sterile tape recording system. It gives
the emotion, it gives you the whole verbal evidence as given to the police officer at
the time. There is no portrayal by the police officer acting in the witness box, and
people can judge for themselves whether the confession was voluntary and how the
words were said. There are a number of police at this seminar, including many from
the C13. It would make our job a lot easier than standing in the box for three or
four days.
In relation to my paper I concentrated on two subjects. One was hostage
negotiation. It is strange how we as a society tolerate certain things to happen. We
look at the road carnage over the last couple of years and we are prepared to accept
that we can be pulled up and blow into a bag although it is an invasion of our civil
rights. We will go to hospital and have blood taken out of our body, and if we don’t
conform to those rules we suffer a penal clause. We will accept that. We will accept
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the fact that police will talk people out of shooting someone in a hostage situation
and illegally obtain some sort of statement on a telephone. We accept that. We have
accepted that at this seminar and yet we do nothing about it. The thing is that it
has been proved throughout the world that extortion and kidnapping are the most
successful crimes in terrorism. We are going to have it here and it is going to come
in a very short space of time. Who then is going to stand up and say they breached
the law, illegally obtained that tape recording of a terrorist situation, or a
kidnapping, when it comes to court? Who then is going to be on a jury and which
judge is going to then use his discretion to exclude that illegally obtained evidence?
That is what is going to happen, and all we are asking for, as police officers, is that
you think about it and change the laws to conform with what is going to happen .
in the future. ‘ . . -
Dr G.D. Woods, Q.C.
Since we have been dealing with the question of confessions I think it. is
worthwhile bearing inmind in relation to the comment by Detective Chad that
people do in fact sometimes confess. Indeed, guilty people usually confess and it is
not true that what they say in the heat of the mOment is usually retracted afterwards.
In fact, most people plead guilty when they get to court — some 85% in the higher
courts, roughly, and some 95% in the lower courts. So when you talk abdut people
who are pleading not guilty and who are contesting their alleged guilt, you'are
talking about a very small proportion anyway. Most people in fact confess and most
people stick by it. But it seems to me that the tape recording system does have a lot
of advantages. I note Mr Horler’s reference to himself as a neo-Luddite. I must
remember not to lend him by car. ‘Mr Harrison chastised me for referring perhaps
excessively to the learned Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Conan Doyle is not entirely
irrelevant when it comes to criminal jurisprudence. Hewas a great supporter of
Oscar Slater. Those of you who know your legal history will recall Oscar Slater. The
Oscar Slater case was the precipitant of the establishment of the court of Criminal
Appeal in England in 1908 and the enactment here in 1912 Of the'Criminal Appeal
Act, so I don’t think it is entirely inappropriate to refer to Conan Doyle — indeed,
if I can make one further reference to him, I should make it clear that I was
suggesting not that the proposedtape recording system for a confession was, as
Conan Doyle titled one of his stories “The Final Solution”, but rather a step in the
right direction. ~ ' ‘ '
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